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After World War I, reallocating the former German and 
Turkish colonies proved to be one of the more challenging 
feats of the peace process. After months of negotiation in 
1919, first in Paris, then in London, the various national 
leaders agreed to create the mandate system, which proved 
to be a compromise between outright colonial expansion and 
genuine independence, whereby the former German and Turkish 
colonies in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East were mandated 
to the conquering nations in trust until the indigenous 
peoples were deemed ready to administer their own 
governments and societies. For decades, the mandate system 
was viewed by scholars as a genuine departure from the 
traditional forms of European colonialism so prevalent in 
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. 
This study departs from previous interpretations while 
accounting for the key contributions from past scholars, 
   
 
providing both new direction and new conclusions. The 
analysis is largely philosophical in nature, tracing the 
primary American role in developing the mandates, while 
examining the developmental ideas behind Wilsonian 
principles such as national self-determination. Moreover, 
though Wilson himself is crucial to the study, the 
historical lens is primarily Edward M. House, who was 
Wilson’s most trusted advisor, with a particular aptitude 
in the realm of foreign affairs. House was instrumental in 
forming the mandate system from 1917 through 1919. 
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1 
INTRODUCTION 
President Woodrow Wilson announced his vision of world 
peace before Congress on January 8, 1918. In his famous 
Fourteen Points address, Wilson outlined a non-punitive 
postwar peace settlement devoted to free trade, national 
self-determination, ending colonialism, and of course a 
“general association of nations” to promote “political 
independence and territorial integrity to great and small 
states alike.”1 At war’s end, Wilson embarked on his crusade 
for a better future, confident that Americans and their 
European Allies could fashion a meaningful, long-lasting 
peace. Yet as the Paris Peace Conference began in January 
1919, the question of whether or not Wilson’s progressive 
philosophy and optimistic rhetoric could withstand the 
staunch realities of peacemaking remained unclear. As many 
in Europe, Africa, and the Middle East surveyed the chaotic 
postwar landscape, they were not easily convinced by 
notions of peace, harmony, and progress. Certainly this was 
true of Europe’s victorious political leaders, who were not 
eager to embrace Wilson’s “enlightened” geopolitics. 
Instead, they sought vengeance and compensation for the 
                                                          
1 Arthur S. Link et al., eds., The Papers of Woodrow Wilson 68 Vols. 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966-1994), 45: 529. Hereafter 
cited as PWW. 
2 
war. Hence, ultimately, securing his vision of progress 
would prove to be far more complicated than Wilson 
anticipated. 
Reallocating the former colonies of the German and 
Ottoman empires was one of the more challenging feats of 
the peace process because the European victors—namely Great 
Britain, France, and Italy—and Japan sought to openly 
expand their colonial empires in 1919. Securing a new 
vision for the colonial world, a progressive American 
vision, was one of the primary objectives of Wilson’s peace 
initiatives. He was aided in this process by several 
individuals, Secretary of State Robert Lansing and noted 
historian George Louis Beer among them. However, no one was 
more important than the president’s close friend and 
advisor, Colonel Edward M. House, who was instrumental in 
forming and implementing U.S. colonial policy from 1917 to 
1919.  
Wilson and House based their postwar colonial vision 
on the principle of national self-determination, which was, 
in truth, steeped in ethno-cultural bias as well as geo-
political self-interest. A crucial impulse urged that the 
newly-articulated League of Nations be responsible for 
overseeing any new or revised colonial structure. After 
3 
months of negotiation in 1919, first in Paris, then in 
London, the various national leaders agreed to create the 
mandate system, which proved to be a compromise between 
outright colonial expansion and genuine independence, 
whereby the former German and Ottoman territories in 
Africa, Asia, and the Middle East were mandated to the 
conquering nations in trust until the indigenous peoples 
were deemed ready to administer their own governments and 
societies. 
Since the mandate system’s origins are the subject of 
this study, it is necessary to place my research within a 
historiographic context. Contemporaries of Wilson and 
House, such as Robert Lansing, David Lloyd George, Lord 
Robert Cecil, and Georges Clemenceau, each published 
memoirs in the years following the peace conference. These 
were largely self-serving in nature, and the mandates were 
minor subjects mentioned in passing, mostly as war trophies 
in the cases of Lloyd George and Clemenceau.
2
 Even George 
Louis Beer, a highly valued contributor to American 
colonial policy, wrote a rather self-important account of 
                                                          
2 Robert Lansing, The Peace Negotiations (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 
1921); David Lloyd George, The Truth about the Peace Treaties 2 vols. 
(London: Victor Gollancz, 1938); Robert Cecil, A Great Experiment (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1941); Georges Clemenceau, Grandeur and 
Misery of Victory (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1930). 
4 
the formative work in 1919, titled, African Questions at 
the Paris Peace Conference, published in 1923. In it, he 
better demonstrated his acumen for pre-World War I colonial 
history than a true understanding or critique of Wilsonian 
progressivism applied to the colonial world.
3
  
In the decades between the world wars, scholarship on 
the mandates was rather technical in nature, surveying the 
intricate applications of the mandate system and attempting 
to gauge the future political horizon of the territories 
under supervision. A monumental study in this regard was 
undoubtedly Quincy Wright’s treatise, Mandates Under the 
League of Nations, published in 1930. It remains a 
benchmark study of the legalities and procedural challenges 
involved with implementing the mandates under League 
supervision. However, while Wright touched on the 
historical origins of the mandates, he offered virtually no 
analysis of the guiding philosophies or the negotiation 
processes of 1919.
4
 Other pioneering scholars of the 
mandates, such as Paul Birdsall and Pitman Potter, wrote 
sound narrative accounts of the 1919 negotiations, yet 
offered limited analysis of the founding principles or the 
                                                          
3 George Louis Beer, African Questions at the Paris Peace Conference 
(New York: The Macmillan Company, 1923). 
4 Quincy Wright, Mandates Under the League of Nations (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1930). 
5 
scheming politicians behind them. The few criticisms 
offered were directed at the British and French for 
undermining the full power of Wilson’s idealistic 
principles intended for the colonies.
5
    
For decades, the mandate system was viewed by scholars 
as a genuine departure from the traditional forms of 
European colonialism so prevalent in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries. Not until after World War Two did a 
growing number of historians seriously evaluate the 
philosophical roots of the mandate system and then offer 
critical perspectives of its application in Africa, Asia, 
and the Middle East. In his groundbreaking book on the 
British Empire, Great Britain and Germany’s Lost Colonies, 
published in 1967, historian William Roger Louis astutely 
argued that British (and French) imperial interests at the 
Paris Peace Conference destroyed what might have been a 
genuine chance for colonial freedom and independence. His 
scathing account of British imperialism contrasted with a 
rather benign evaluation of American complicity in 
perpetuating imperialism through the Mandate System. Here 
Louis proffered the notion of Wilson the naïve idealist, 
                                                          
5 Paul Birdsall, Versailles Twenty Years After (New York: Reynal and 
Hitchcock, 1941); Pitman Potter, “Origin of the System of Mandates 
under the League of Nations.” American Political Science Review 16 
(January-March, 1966): 1-38. 
6 
whose progressive vision for the colonies was stymied by 
resolute imperialists such as Clemenceau and Lloyd George.
6
 
Contemporaries of William Roger Louis, such as Hessel 
Duncan Hall and Gaddis Smith, offered similar evaluations 
in the 1960s and 1970s.
7
    
The idea has persisted among many historians that a 
well-intentioned Woodrow Wilson encountered staunch 
opposition to his idealistic proposals in Paris, and was 
therefore forced to compromise his principles in favor of 
securing a fragmented allotment of his progressive vision.
8
 
In the last few decades, the mandates have been tied to 
this specific discussion, if they are even mentioned at 
all. Several recent studies bear this out, such as Margaret 
                                                          
6 William Roger Louis, Great Britain and Germany’s Lost Colonies 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967). 
7 Hessel Duncan Hall, “The British Commonwealth and the Founding of the 
League Mandate System,” Studies in International History, ed. K. Bourne 
and D.C. Watt (Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, 1967); Gaddis Smith, “The 
British Government and the Disposition of the German Colonies in 
Africa, 1914-1919.” In Britain and Germany in Africa: Imperial Rivalry 
and Colonial Rule, Edited by William Roger Louis (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1967). 
8 Thomas A. Bailey: Woodrow Wilson and the Great Betrayal (New York: The 
Macmillan Company, 1945) and Woodrow Wilson and the Lost Peace (New 
York: Quadrangle Books, 1963). More recent historians have typically 
been less adamant about Wilson’s failed idealism, but continue to offer 
rather traditional evaluations anyway. The following are good examples: 
Thomas J. Knock, To End All Wars: Woodrow Wilson and the Quest for a 
New World Order (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992) and Arthur 
Walworth, Wilson and His Peacemakers: American Diplomacy at the Paris 
Peace Conference, 1919 (New York: W.W. Norton, 1986); John Milton 
Cooper, Jr., The Warrior and the Priest: Woodrow Wilson and Theodore 
Roosevelt (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1983) and 
Breaking the Heart of the World: Woodrow Wilson and the Fight for the 
League of Nations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). 
7 
MacMillan’s prize-winning 2001 book, Paris, 1919: Six 
Months That Changed the World. In it she includes a brief 
chapter on the mandates, which correctly defines the 
mandate system as a form of veiled imperialism. Yet she, 
too, characterizes Wilson as the frustrated idealist, 
unable to secure his progressive colonial vision due to 
opposition from old-guard colonials in his midst. According 
to MacMillan, then, Wilson’s idealism should be taken 
literally.
9
 In 2007, Erez Manela took this idea a step 
further in his study, The Wilsonian Moment, claiming that 
various revolutionary movements in Egypt, India, China, and 
Korea throughout 1919 could trace their inspirational roots 
to Wilsonian idealism but were disillusioned by “the 
failure of liberal anti-colonialism.”10 Most recently, in 
Ross Kennedy's 2011 edited volume, A Companion to Woodrow 
Wilson, historian Priscilla Roberts’ brief assessment of 
the mandates again offers the interpretation that Wilsonian 
progressivism failed on the colonial issue, not because 
Wilson’s vision was particularly flawed or unsound, but 
rather because he and the American delegates simply failed 
                                                          
9 Margaret MacMillan, Paris, 1919: Six Months That Changed the World 
(New York: Random House, 2001). 
10 Erez Manela, The Wilsonian Moment: Self-Determination and the 
International Origins of Anticolonial Nationalism (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2007). 
8 
to contend against the rampant imperial desires of their 
European counterparts.
11
    
This study departs from the intensely technical pieces 
on the form and function of the mandates as well as these 
previous interpretations by historians. While accounting 
for the key contributions from past scholars, the research 
provides both new direction and new conclusions. 
Significantly, the analysis is largely philosophical in 
nature, tracing the primary American role in developing the 
mandates, while examining the developmental ideas behind 
Wilsonian principles such as national self-determination. 
Moreover, though Wilson himself is crucial to the study, 
the historical lens is primarily on Edward M. House, who 
was Wilson’s most trusted advisor, with a particular 
aptitude in the realm of foreign affairs.  
House was instrumental in forming the mandate system 
from 1917 through 1919. Yet his role in this process has 
been misrepresented or ignored completely. For example, in 
her seminal 1973 book, Colonel House in Paris: A Study of 
American Policy at the Paris Peace Conference, Inga Floto 
blamed House for undermining American peace initiatives, 
                                                          
11 Priscilla Roberts, “Wilson, Europe's Colonial Empires, and the Issue 
of Imperialism,” in Ross Kennedy, ed., A Companion to Woodrow Wilson 
(Malden, Mass.: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011). 
9 
claiming he went around Wilson to secure his own vision for 
the peace. Moreover, Floto chose to focus solely on House’s 
roles in Paris, though he was vitally important during 
colonial negotiations in London during the summer of 1919.
12
 
More recently, in his 2006 biography, Woodrow Wilson’s 
Right Hand: The Life of Colonel Edward M. House, British 
scholar Godfrey Hodgson adequately covers certain elements 
of the Paris Peace Conference but neglects to mention a 
number of crucial roles fulfilled by House, among them his 
direction of American colonial policy. A worse oversight is 
Hodgson’s claim that House spent July and August of 1919 
vacationing, when, in fact, he was leading the U.S. 
delegation at the Mandates Commission in London.
13
   
Most historians writing on the mandate system’s 
origins believe the American delegates were forced into 
numerous compromises by Britain’s David Lloyd George, 
France’s Georges Clemenceau, and leaders from the British 
Dominions such as South Africa’s Jan Smuts. Yet, by framing 
Edward House and Woodrow Wilson as idealists, naïvely 
determined to recast the globe and create a new world 
order, such interpretations inherently abide by their own 
                                                          
12 Inga Floto, Colonel House in Paris: A Study of American Policy at the 
Paris Peace Conference (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973). 
13 Godfrey Hodgson, Woodrow Wilson’s Right Hand: The Life of Colonel 
Edward M. House (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006). 
10 
definitions of the Wilsonian approach to colonial progress. 
Within such interpretive frameworks, President Wilson’s 
stated interests for national self-determination, economic 
globalization, and collective security are often portrayed 
as indicators of failure, largely because a varied form of 
colonial imperialism continued and the supposed Wilsonian 
vision did not come to fruition. A notable exception to 
this historiographic consensus is Andrew Zimmermann’s 
Alabama in Africa, which focuses on Togo in a transnational 
framework that features the New South of the United States 
and the colonialism of the German Empire. In this study, he 
emphasizes the consensus among American and European 
leaders and the continuity from German imperialism to the 
League of Nations.
14
  
However, grappling with Wilson’s and House’s own 
perceptions of the world seems more apropos when attempting 
to understand the myriad complexities of the negotiations. 
In truth, despite the concessions made by Wilson and House 
at the Paris Peace Conference, the creation of the mandate 
system should be viewed as a significant achievement for 
Wilsonian progressivism as they understood it. Yet, 
                                                          
14 Andrew Zimmermann, Alabama in Africa: Booker T. Washington, the 
German Empire, and the Globalization of the New South (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2010). 
11 
paradoxically, both Wilson and House were unrealistic in 
their assessment of European colonialism. They projected 
their own American concepts of liberty, social justice, and 
morality onto the international stage, hoping to facilitate 
broad social and political reform.  
 The Wilsonian legacy remains at the center of world 
affairs. Accordingly, this study of the mandate system 
deals with concepts that still shape the international 
debate over the ongoing global war on terrorism. How the 
British or the Americans, in 1919 or 2013, should attempt 
to stabilize the Middle East is but one example of the 
contemporary relevance of my research. 
 
 
 
12 
CHAPTER 1 
THE WAR’S END AND EMERGING COLONIAL QUESTIONS, 1917 - 1918 
 Resolving colonial questions eventually became a 
crucial topic of consideration in the build-up to the peace 
after World War I. However, in April 1917, when the United 
States formally entered the Great War, the future status of 
colonies around the world garnered relatively little 
attention from European and American governments. They and 
their citizens were far more concerned with the immediate 
strategic realities of the conflict that had been raging 
for nearly three years, a conflict for which there appeared 
to be no end in sight.  
THE FINAL PHASES OF WAR 
In February 1917, after nearly a two-year hiatus, 
Germany had re-initiated its unrestricted submarine 
warfare, hoping at long last to strangle the supply lines 
of Britain and France. As was the case in 1915, Germany’s 
decision to order its U-boats to engage targets without 
warning was problematic at best. Predictably, several 
vessels from neutral countries were torpedoed by German U-
boats, injuring or killing passengers and crew members. The 
outraged responses were swift; and American entry in April 
13 
was, at least in part, attributed to Germany’s resumption 
of unrestricted U-boat warfare.
1
  
  Stalemate still reigned along the three European 
fronts by the spring of 1917. In the East, the remnants of 
Russia’s once-proud army that had not deserted gamely 
fought on. They did so despite their likely confusion over 
the onset in March of a revolution that would ultimately 
topple the Romanov dynasty and elevate to power Vladimir I. 
Lenin’s Bolsheviks. Then, in the Brest-Litovsk Treaty 
signed eleven months later, in March 1918, the Bolsheviks 
agreed to a separate peace with Germany, removing Russia 
from the war in the midst of Germany’s resurgent offensives 
on the western front.
2
  
In April 1917, however, such eventualities were 
unknown, still in the future. Instead, all combatants were 
concentrating on strategic and tactical operations for 
their late spring offensives. No government of the Allied 
or Central Powers could have predicted that the armistice 
                                                          
1 Much has been written about the U-boat campaigns by Germany and the 
consequences of the “unrestricted warfare” policy. The following 
studies are especially helpful: Thomas Bailey and Paul Ryan, The 
Lusitania Disaster (New York: The Free Press, 1975); Diana Preston, 
Lusitania: An Epic Tragedy (New York: Walker & Company, 2002). 
2 Morgan Philips Price, My Reminiscences of the Russian Revolution 
(London: Allen and Unwin, 1921), 147; John M. Thompson, Russia, 
Bolshevism, and the Versailles Peace (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1966), 3-4; Robert K. Massie, Nicholas and Alexandra (New York: 
Atheneum, 1987), 458.  
14 
would occur in eighteen months, ending the fighting and 
signaling the demise of the German, Austro-Hungarian, and 
Ottoman empires. Instead, during this penultimate spring of 
combat, the opposing armies still fought in the hopes of 
achieving the decisive battlefield victories that had 
eluded them, victories they hoped would end the war.  
After arriving in France, American “doughboys" fought 
well. In 1918, they were instrumental in throwing back the 
German offensives in places like Cantigny, Chateau-Thierry, 
and Belleau Wood. In concert with allied units, their 
combat service then culminated in the Meuse-Argonne 
Offensive, which brought fighting to a close.
3
 
Of course, when the armistice finally occurred in 
November 1918, and the guns fell silent, the belligerent 
governments and their people began to survey the damage. In 
truth, much of the world, but especially Europe, was in 
shock from the trauma of the Great War, numbed by the 
realities of the experience. For a time, many were simply 
grateful it was all over. But as reality set in, the 
consequences began to unfurl, weighing heavily on postwar 
Europe and America. While some welcomed home long-absent 
                                                          
3 R. H. Lutz, ed., The Fall of the German Empire (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1932), 478; Robert H. Ferrell, America’s Deadliest 
Battle (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2007), xi.    
15 
fathers, sons, husbands, and brothers, others mourned the 
loved and lost. Compared to Europe, America had barely 
bloodied its nose in the war, with casualties totaling 
323,018 dead and wounded U.S. servicemen. While a shocking 
figure, European losses were far worse and much of the 
continent was in shambles. All told, approximately 8.5 
million combatants were dead and more than 21 million 
wounded. Moreover, an additional 18-20 million people would 
die globally from influenza by 1920.
4
  
THE STAKES OF WAR AND PEACE 
Understandably, many began to ask for an accounting at 
war’s end. The questions seemed to anticipate the 
nihilistic responses that would later come. What had it all 
been for? What had the nations fought to preserve? Was 
Western Civilization even worth preserving?  
In line with their wartime propaganda campaigns, 
French and British officials responded by publicly claiming 
that the war had been forced upon them by German militarism 
and the Huns’ feverish pursuit of wanton destruction.5   
They played the part of innocent, peace-loving nations that 
had been forced to defend themselves against barbarism.  
                                                          
4 See http://www.pbs.org/greatwar/resources/casdeath_pop.html   
Accessed January 9, 2013. 
5 J. M. Winter, The Great War and the British People (London: Macmillan, 
1986), especially chapters 3 and 4. 
16 
Predictably, they alleged that Germany was the nation 
solely responsible for causing and perpetuating the war.
6
  
Given the shared realities of European imperialism and 
the arms race augmenting regional tensions prior to 1914, 
such claims were largely self-serving. The rhetoric 
capitalized upon anti-German sentiments in both Britain and 
France in 1918. In essence, Allied claims of German war 
responsibility overlooked the reality of a shared European 
catastrophe and justified thinly veiled attempts to 
rationalize punishing Germany while validating British and 
French wartime policies. Not surprisingly, the demoralized, 
heartbroken populations of France and Britain largely 
agreed with the sentiments expressed by their respective 
government leaders and journalists. Someone had to pay. Why 
not the Germans?  
For its part, Germany was in social and political 
revolution when the armistice was signed in November 1918. 
Much like their British, French, and Russian adversaries, 
most Germans, civilians and soldiers alike, had favored 
going to war in 1914. At the time, many had believed in the 
pro-war rhetoric, possessing a keen, though flawed sense of 
                                                          
6 Winter, The Great War and the British People, chapter 4 See also 
George Creel, The War, the World, and Wilson (New York: Harper, 1920), 
122.  
17 
national unity and purpose, namely a commitment to serve 
and support Kaiser Wilhelm II and the cause of German 
nationalism.
7
 Of course, as with new and eager soldiers 
throughout history, most of Germany’s young volunteers 
possessed strikingly romantic views of war in the summer of 
1914. They viewed it as a great adventure, an opportunity 
to distinguish themselves in battle and then return home in 
glory as national heroes. Relatively few anticipated the 
realities of modern warfare that would assault their bodies 
and minds.  
Four years later, Germany’s national consciousness had 
undergone a dramatic transformation. Nearly 2 million 
Germans were either killed or missing and presumed dead. 
More than 4 million had been wounded.
8
 These once-proud 
German soldiers were, of course, considered the “lucky 
ones.” They returned home in defeat, physically and 
psychologically traumatized by their combat experiences on 
land and sea and in the air. The scope of the tragedy, the 
sheer futility of fighting for a failed cause and losing an 
entire generation in the process gripped many at war’s end. 
                                                          
7 Ronald Stromberg, Redemption by War (Lawrence: University of Kansas 
Press, 1970); Robert Wohl, The Generation of 1914 (New York: Knopf, 
1975).  
8 See http://www.pbs.org/greatwar/resources/casdeath_pop.html   
Accessed January 10, 2013.  
18 
However, unlike Britain, France, and the United States, who 
could at least claim victory, Germany faced coming to terms 
not only with the tragic war losses they had incurred, but 
also with the shame of losing the conflict. Not a few 
Germans spiraled downward into nihilism, seeking answers to 
important questions: Who was to blame for the defeat? What 
would become of the German government, its economy, and its 
people?
9
 The answers would not be immediately forthcoming 
and they would not be well received by Germans when they 
did arrive. 
Given such a cultural context, it is not overly 
surprising that the ensuing chaos erupted throughout the 
country. The Kaiser abdicated the throne on November 9, 
1918, departing in shame. The German Empire of nearly fifty 
years was no more.
10
 In its place a German Social Democratic 
politician named Philipp Scheidemann arbitrarily declared a 
republic into existence, without any real authority to do 
so. Several rival political factions were vying for power 
at the same time. While the new German government 
                                                          
9 Martin Gilbert, The First World War (New York: Henry Holt, 1994), 369; 
Martin Middlebrook, The Kaiser’s Battle (New York: Penguin, 1983), 146, 
306; Rudolph Binding, A Fatalist at War, trans. by I. Morrow (London: 
Allen and Unwin, 1929), 234-7.    
10 Middlebrook, The Kaiser’s Battle, 146-54; Lutz, ed., The Fall of the 
German Empire, 478-79; Eric Metaxas, Bonhoeffer: Pastor, Martyr, 
Prophet, Spy (Nashville: Thomas Nelson, 2010), 33-35. 
19 
eventually consolidated its authority by 1919 as the Weimar 
Republic, establishing an ostensibly democratic system, its 
leadership remained problematic throughout the 1920s, 
lacking true consensus and ensuring that the German people 
remained divided and confused.
11
 
And then there was the United States. By November 
1918, President Woodrow Wilson was well known to most 
Europeans as the intellectual, idealistic American leader. 
Few understood the deeper, complex forces that motivated a 
man like Wilson. In keeping with widespread American 
isolationism during the previous election of 1916, one of 
Wilson’s key campaign slogans simply stated: “He kept us 
out of war.” Such idealistic rhetoric was, of course, 
misleading. In truth, Wilson’s foreign intervention record 
indicated otherwise, as in the case of America’s campaigns 
against the notorious Francisco “Pancho” Villa in Mexico. 
Nonetheless, Wilson deftly sidestepped such realities and 
capitalized politically by claiming to loathe war as a 
general principle of conflict resolution. However, going 
before the U.S. Congress on April 2, 1917, and seeking a 
                                                          
11 Metaxas, Bonhoeffer, 34-35; C. B. Burdick and R. H. Lutz, eds., The 
Political Institutions of the German Revolution, 1918-1919 (New York: 
Praeger, 1966), 70-1; A. J. Ryder, The German Revolution of 1918: A 
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U.S. declaration of war against Germany, the president 
neatly accounted for the swinging cultural pendulum that 
increasingly favored war. Ever the politician, his rhetoric 
was fashioned around a new mission, a deceptively noble 
sounding mission: America would fight to end the war 
because, in his words, “the world must be made safe for 
democracy.”12 
The following January, Wilson articulated his famous 
vision for the future in his Fourteen Points speech before  
Congress. In it, Wilson identified a desire for a generous, 
non-punitive postwar peace settlement. The key points 
proclaimed the need for an “open” world at war’s end, which 
would include “open covenants” as well as freedom of the 
seas, equal trade rights, arms reductions, calls for self-
determination for nations in Europe, and even the abolition 
of colonialism. And in case anyone doubted the president’s 
ability to make this utopian scheme a reality, he saved the 
best for last. Point fourteen advocated the creation of “a 
general association of nations” to bring about “political 
independence and territorial integrity to great and small 
states alike.”13 Ostensibly, Wilson’s League of Nations, as 
                                                          
12 Woodrow Wilson’s address to Congress, April 2, 1917, PWW, 41: 519-27.  
13 Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points speech before Congress, January 8, 
1918, PWW, 45:529. 
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it became known, would help to oversee the establishment of 
a new, enlightened order in the postwar world.   
As the next chapter of this study will demonstrate in 
more detail, Wilson’s rhetorical expression of these 
idealistic, even romantic sentiments often belied his 
genuine strains of thought in politics and international 
affairs. Thus, when applied to broad philosophical 
concepts, such as national self-determination, the unique 
strains of Wilsonian progressivism were far more complex 
(and disturbing) than many contemporaries or future 
scholars realized. For instance, Wilson’s integration of 
Christian ethics and public policy appeared admirable. Yet 
his seeming commitment to virtuous, progressive policies 
was often marred by a deeply-ingrained racism, a belief in 
Anglo-Saxon superiority, applications of Social Darwinsim, 
and a sense of American Exceptionalism. 
 However, these complexities of the Wilsonian mind 
would not have been evident to the casual observer. 
Instead, most who heard or read Wilson in 1917 and 1918 
viewed the president strictly through the lens of 
progressive politics. As such, he was widely perceived as 
an American idealist, and his rhetoric captivated Europeans 
and Americans alike who were desperately searching for 
22 
meaning. Wilson seemed to offer a way of viewing the Great 
War as a tragic, yet significant means of catharsis, an 
opportunity to pursue a long-desired cultural renaissance.
14
 
A number of questions arise. Most importantly, how 
accurate were such notions? What were the crucial stakes of 
the long-fought war and the subsequent peace that would be 
fashioned in its wake? Altruistic speeches and articles 
about honor, virtue, redemption, and accountability may 
have been well received by European and American citizens 
eager for some measure of validation, some profound 
understanding of sacrifice. However, emotional, 
manipulative rhetoric aside, the most influential guiding 
principles were actually based in power politics. Within 
the corridors of political power in Washington, London, 
Paris, and Rome the likes of Woodrow Wilson, David Lloyd 
George, Georges Clémenceau, and Vittorio Orlando (and their 
subordinate aides) were busy scrutinizing the geopolitical 
ramifications of the war as it neared its conclusion.  
Of primary importance, the balance of power, 
especially in Europe, was at stake. When the war was still 
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winding down in late 1918, much thought had already been 
given to accruing spoils of war and visiting vengeance upon 
Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Turkey. Redrawing the 
boundaries of Europe certainly appealed to Britian, France, 
and Italy to be sure. Also at stake, however, was the focus 
of this study, the colonial possessions of each European 
power. While colonial issues may have been secondary to the 
European (or continental) balance of power, the colonies 
were still profoundly important to all sides. As such, 
differing perspectives on the future of colonialism—such as 
outright annexation, trusteeship, or independence—garnered 
much attention.
15
  
IMPERIAL RATIONALES AND COLONIAL SYSTEMS 
In order to provide context for the key colonial 
questions that rose to the forefront by 1918, a brief 
historical retrospective is in order regarding the 
narcissistic impulses that prompted colonialism as well as 
a basic overview of the colonial systems themselves. While 
administration varied among the colonial powers, at least 
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in precise methodology, the philosophical rationales were 
nearly universal for European colonialism in the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries. Europe’s colonial impulses were 
steeped in the age-old principles of imperialism: wealth, 
power, and prestige. Ethnocentric ideology and the insular 
logic of self-interest combined to foster the European 
desire to possess colonies.  
Imperialism dates at least as far back as the ancient 
realms of the Persians, Greeks, and Romans, to name a few. 
Since nearly all imperial kingdoms and nation-states 
throughout history have equated accumulating valuable 
resources and commodities to the creation and maintenance 
of empire, twentieth-century Europeans were certainly not 
inventing the colonial wheel, so to speak. Accumulating 
power and wealth remained a key principle. Of course in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, mercantilism had 
reigned as the key economic philosophy on which the 
expanding global empires of Europe were based. Founded on 
the notion that global resources were finite, mercantilism 
prompted nations to compete with one another, applying all 
available means to secure territories and resources for 
25 
their own prosperity.
16
 Adam Smith’s 1776 publication, An 
Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of 
Nations, famously contended against mercantilism, favoring 
the broad acceptance and application of free market 
economic principles.
17
 By 1900, however, Europe’s imperial 
philosophies and methodologies were based upon contemporary 
geopolitical realities and economic principles. In 
practice, variants of mercantile philosophy remained alive 
and well when war erupted in 1914, entrenched at the very 
heart of Europe’s ongoing imperial competitions.  
Accumulating resources as the engines of imperial 
wealth and power may have been crucial, but equally 
influential were the notions of honor and prestige attached 
to colonial possessions. By the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, Europeans viewed their colonial 
empires as synonymous with national greatness, the laws of 
competition, and even with the idea of cultural fitness. A 
popular belief held that colonies were positive reflections 
of the mother country, capable of enhancing a nation’s 
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unique character, certainly, but also of promoting the 
inherent glories of Western Civilization more broadly. Not 
surprisingly, maps of colonial holdings in Africa and Asia 
were embraced as powerful symbols of wealth and prestige, 
even of a nation’s future destiny.18    
Economic philosophies and prideful, ethnocentric 
associations between civilization and colonization 
furnished rationales to support the subjugation of 
indigenous peoples around the world. The argument that 
Western technological advancement equaled inherent cultural 
progress convinced many, especially when Rudyard Kipling’s 
ideas of “The White Man’s Burden” were combined with the 
Darwinian notion that all of humankind was engaged in an 
evolutionary struggle in which only the fittest would 
survive. The Social Darwinist logic of Herbert Spencer and 
others seemed inescapable. Great cultures should expand and 
possess vast empires to the “benefit” of “lesser” cultures. 
The natives had to be “civilized” and the various raw  
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materials then applied in service to the home country.
19
  
Ultimately, when combined with their inherent belief 
in both racial and cultural superiority, it was not a huge 
philosophical leap for Europeans to rationalize colonialism 
as both economically prudent and culturally progressive. 
Throughout Africa, Asia, and portions of the Middle East, 
explorers, adventurers, and missionaries gave way to 
traders, government administrators, and soldiers. These 
empires were, in many ways, products of the industrial 
revolution and of Europe’s advantage in technical 
innovation, especially in weaponry. By the late-nineteenth 
century, a complex network of ports, trading centers, 
railroads, plantations and mines covered the African 
continent as well as parts of the Asian mainland and island 
territories.
20
 
The consequences were many, and they were tragic for 
native populations living under colonial rule. European 
administrators established themselves as the ruling class, 
overseeing the formation and conduct of colonial policy. 
                                                          
19 Rudyard Kipling, “The White Man’s Burden” (1899), in E. Boehmer, ed., 
Empire Writing: An Anthology of Colonial Literature, 1870-1914 (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1998), 273; Louis, Ends of British 
Imperialism, 35. Perhaps the best intellectual evaluation of Social 
Darwinism’s applications may be found in Richard Hofstadter, Social 
Darwinism in American Thought, rev. ed. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1992).  
20 Brian Digre, Imperialism’s New Clothes: The Repartition of Tropical 
Africa, 1914-1919 (New York: Peter Lang, 1990), especially chapters 1–
3. 
28 
They became the social and political elite. Conversely, the 
native populations were relegated to stratified service 
castes in most colonial settlements. Those from culturally 
elite families were, conceivably, allowed to work in useful 
social or political jobs, but always in service to the 
Europeans in charge. The remaining members of native 
populations found themselves in a vast assortment of jobs 
in service to their respective colonial overseers: 
mineworkers, ranch hands, laborers on rubber plantations, 
shipyard workers, and the like.  
The technical application of colonial policies varied 
among the British, French, Germans, Belgians, and others. 
In other words, while colonialism was universally harmful 
to the indigenous populations, certain colonial governments 
pursued measures of peaceful co-existence more effectively 
than others. By and large those living in places like 
British Malaya experienced far better conditions than those 
living under the brutally harsh realities of Belgian rule 
in King Leopold’s so-called “Congo Free State.” 
Nonetheless, the inescapable truth is that indigenous 
peoples around the world had their kingdoms and countries, 
their very ways of life stolen from them by Europeans. They 
subsequently found themselves living in their own native 
29 
lands in subservient roles. Such were the atrocious 
realities of colonialism.
21
   
EMERGING QUESTIONS AND HISTORICAL PRECEDENTS 
When war broke out in 1914, Europe and its combined 
imperial territories consisted of approximately 15,000,000 
square miles, nearly 85 percent of the globe’s land 
surfaces. During the war, Germany surrendered its colonies 
in Cameroon, Togoland, and Southwest Africa after several 
brutal military campaigns in those territories. At the time 
of the armistice, Germany still retained its colony in East 
Africa, though the odds of permanent possession were 
unlikely at that juncture. Turkish holdings in the Middle 
East—namely those in Syria, Palestine, Trans-Jordan, and 
Iraq—also became vital topics of debate. Hence, at war’s 
end, the victorious powers—namely Britain, France, Italy, 
Japan, Belgium and to a lesser degree the United States—had 
to decide the fates of their own colonial holdings as well 
as those of the former German and Ottoman empires, 
respectively.
22
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Map 1.1 
Colonial Africa, 1914 
 
31 
 
 
 
 
 
Map 1.2 
Pacific Island Colonies, 1914 
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Map 1.3 
Colonial Middle East, 1914  
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These decisions would be complicated, to be sure. 
Important questions included the following: should the 
victorious colonial powers maintain their own colonial 
possessions? Should they additionally consider dividing the 
colonial spoils by annexing the former German and Turkish 
colonies? Conversely, given the idealistic surge of 
rhetoric emanating from the likes of Woodrow Wilson, 
members of the Arab revolt, and other indigenous groups, 
should all colonies be granted independence? Or, lastly, 
should some gain independence while others remained within 
the colonial structure?   
Given the sharp divisions between pro-colonial voices 
in Europe and the British dominions versus those advocating 
the end of colonialism, resolving the colonial questions 
seemed like a mountain peak too difficult to climb in 
November 1918. Perhaps predictably, some of the precedents 
relied upon to inform their decisions moving forward—namely 
the Berlin Act of 1885, the Brussels Act of 1892, and the 
Algeciras Convention of 1906—had each been utilized by 
European powers to ostensibly legalize their ambitious 
scrambling for colonial gains in the first place.
23
 Other 
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proposals in 1918, including those by Woodrow Wilson and 
South Africa’s Jan Smuts, at first blush appeared to be 
comparatively enlightened reformations of traditional 
colonial structures.
24
 But how may we measure the rhetoric 
in these proposals? What were the key intellectual 
foundations informing Wilsonian progressivism in 
particular? Those questions will be the focal points of the 
next chapter.     
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Chapter 2 
The Wilsonian Mind and a Progressive World Order 
Over the years, many historical critiques of Wilsonian 
statecraft have characterized U.S. postwar initiatives in 
1918-1919 as overly idealistic, prone to naïve perceptions 
of geopolitical power structures and vulnerable to the 
devious machinations of Europe’s more realistic and 
seasoned politicians, such as Britain’s David Lloyd George 
and his French counterpart, Georges Clemenceau. According 
to such traditional narratives, Woodrow Wilson, Edward M. 
House, and their American aides succumbed to immense 
pressure and were forced to abandon their idealistic 
principles at the Paris Peace Conference in the face of 
wily, cynical opposition from the British, French, and 
Italian delegations.
1
 Ostensibly, the compromises involved 
issues ranging from Europe’s border restructuring and 
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economic reparations to the focus of this study, the 
principle of national self-determination in the colonial 
world. American history survey texts are actually fairly 
decent barometers for measuring the consensus views among 
historians on a variety of topics. Regarding Woodrow 
Wilson’s vision for postwar peace, many popular college 
survey texts in the United States continue to present 
students with some variant of the narrative about America’s 
“failure” to secure its idealistic promises in 1919.2   
FLAWED INTERPRETIVE ASSUMPTIONS 
However, such interpretations are based upon flawed 
notions of the colonial objectives that Wilson and House 
ultimately pursued in Paris (and subsequently London) in 
1919. Analytical shortcomings are prominent in these 
studies. Assumptions of failure stem from false premises, 
which invariably produce unsound conclusions regarding 
American peace initiatives for the postwar colonial world. 
The claims of American failure are specifically based upon 
the fact that the lion’s share of former German and Turkish 
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colonies did not achieve outright independence as a result 
of the League of Nations Covenant.
3
 
Wilsonian progressive philosophy has often been 
perceived as being inherently opposed to traditional 
European imperial philosophy as well as the resulting 
colonial systems. Equating Wilsonian rhetoric on principles 
of national self-determination with their own notions of 
progressive history, Wilson’s near-contemporaries as well 
as future scholars often assumed that the Wilsonian vision 
was inherently idealistic, entailing the literal, universal 
pursuit of equality and independence for indigenous peoples 
under Europe’s colonial rule.4 Since no such vision of 
progress came to fruition after the Paris Peace Conference 
in 1919, frequent conclusions have revolved around the idea 
that Wilsonian progressivism was flawed, perhaps inherently 
naïve and unachievable.
5
 The logic seems soothingly 
inescapable. By ascribing American failure to “compromise” 
and “acquiescence,” traditional interpretations have often 
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turned Wilson and House into simplistic caricatures, 
political idealists whose supposed naiveté proved 
detrimental when facing savvy political realists, primarily 
within the British and French delegations. 
The truth of the matter is that the eventual colonial 
settlement was ultimately far more in line with Wilsonian 
progressivism than many believe. Accurately comprehending 
the American colonial initiatives engaged by President 
Woodrow Wilson and Edward M. House requires a sound 
understanding of the Wilsonian mind, particularly of the 
philosophical roots and personal experiences that served as 
the foundations for the Wilsonian brand of progressivism 
endorsed by these two men.  
To begin measuring Wilsonian perspectives on 
progressive global relations, understanding his 
intellectual foundations is essential. What are these? As 
historian Lloyd Ambrosius indicates in Wilsonian 
Statecraft: Theory and Practice of Liberal Internationalism 
during World War I, Wilson’s “progressive philosophy of 
history provided the important intellectual foundations for 
his liberal internationalism.”  Ambrosius goes on to 
characterize Wilson’s perspectives in this manner: 
39 
The president’s understanding of progressive history 
embraced the Social Gospel in American Christianity. 
He wanted to redeem the Old World from its outmoded 
system of alliances that depended upon a discredited 
balance of power. He sought to establish a new 
community of nations that would rely instead on 
collective security. Identification of U.S. foreign 
policy with the progressive fulfillment of God’s will 
on earth limited Wilson’s disposition to compromise.6    
 
In essence, Woodrow Wilson was both a traditionalist and a 
modernist, an old guard Christian moralist who nonetheless 
believed in modern ideas such as Social Darwinism, which 
conformed neatly to the germ theory, emphasizing heredity 
as the prime shaper in human history. And though he 
generally idealized the Anglo-Saxon heritage, believing 
Western Civilization was inherently superior, Wilson was 
also a genuine American exceptionalist. For him, the United 
States was a uniquely blessed cultural experiment among the 
enlightened nations of the world.
7
   
Some crucial questions arise. What is the genesis of 
such philosophies? Where did these prevailing concepts of 
progressivism come from? And more importantly, why did 
Woodrow Wilson believe them? To provide some answers, a 
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brief overview of Wilson’s various philosophical 
foundations is merited.  
COMMON SENSE REALISM CHRISTIANITY 
Born in Staunton, Virginia on December 28, 1856, 
Thomas Woodrow Wilson was a child of the South, spending 
the majority of his youth in Georgia, before moving to 
South Carolina in 1870. He was raised by devout, though 
intellectually-oriented Christian parents of primarily 
Scottish ancestry. His father, the Rev. Joseph R. Wilson, 
was a Southern Presbyterian minister whose influence on his 
son was enormous. In truth, the young Woodrow Wilson 
benefited immensely from the demanding, yet loving home 
environment, and he would later give much credit to both 
his father and mother for modeling the intellectual and 
spiritual virtues that allowed him to thrive.
8
 
A rationalist and scholarly approach, based upon the 
Scottish Reformed tradition, gave depth and dimension to 
Wilson’s Christianity, and remained central to his 
worldview throughout his life. But what was entailed in 
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this approach? By the mid-nineteenth century, Protestant, 
evangelical Christianity in America existed within two 
basic theological streams. The populist evangelical branch, 
spawned by the First and Second Great Awakenings, gradually 
became a widely embraced wing of the Christian faith, with 
a strong revivalist style that downplayed rigid doctrine 
and appealed broadly to ordinary folk rather than social 
elites, seminary-trained clergymen, or intellectuals. Most 
notable in the southern states, the populist orientation 
originally included mostly Baptists, Methodists, and 
denominational offshoots such as the Restoration Movement 
(the Churches of Christ and the Disciples of Christ).
9
   
The other theological branch was rationalist and 
scholarly. Centered primarily in the North, it included 
those within the Presbyterian, Congregationalist, and 
Episcopalian churches. Especially within Presbyterianism, 
theology and doctrine were steeped in the philosophy of 
Common Sense Realism, which had been a part of the Scottish 
Reformed tradition for more than a century. In essence, the 
Common Sense approach argued that most nineteenth-century 
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thinkers included among the self-evident, universal truths 
many of the basic teachings of Christianity, such as God’s 
existence, His goodness, and His creation of the world. In 
other words, the Common Sense wing of Scottish Reformed 
Christianity favored an evidential form of apologetics, 
emphasizing truths knowable by believer and unbeliever 
alike, which ultimately allowed individuals to evaluate 
competing doctrines and worldviews on similar footing.
10
 
Woodrow Wilson ultimately came to favor a rather 
interesting combination of evangelicalism’s populist and 
scholarly branches, uniting evangelical fervor with a more 
traditional emphasis on theology and scholarship. Largely 
due to his father’s Scottish Reformed Presbyterianism, 
Wilson naturally absorbed much of the Common Sense 
philosophy as a theological foundation. In this vein, he 
seems to have viewed his Christianity somewhat more 
holistically, as a rationalist might. For him, the precepts 
of the Bible were more than just morality plays that could 
be embraced or discarded according to the individual 
conscience, or cast into the realm of private values. 
Rather, for Wilson, the truths of scripture could be 
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readily understood within the context of real human 
experience, as logical, universal guidelines regarding how 
humans were meant to think and act.
11
  
Interestingly, however, Woodrow Wilson appears to have 
combined this rational, scholarly approach to Christianity 
with elements of the populist vision. Hence, while he 
certainly embraced Scottish Reformed theology, the zeal of 
the populist approach was also ingrained in Wilson. This is 
not overly surprising considering Wilson’s formative years 
were spent in the South, where populist evangelicalism was 
most prominent.
12
  
Consequences abound. Woodrow Wilson understood 
Christianity as a definitive, universal worldview that 
codified the nature of human life. Moreover, its precepts 
could be logically connected to and measured by the 
realities of the human experience. Hence, Christianity was 
demonstrably true. Moreover, the emotional currents of 
evangelical populism prompted the zealous Wilson to action, 
lest his Christian faith be relegated solely to church 
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activities.
13
 If, indeed, Christian precepts were 
universally right and good, then might it be possible to 
use these verities as rationales for meaningful public 
policy, weaving them into the very fabric of American 
culture, and perhaps other cultures as well? Wilson aimed 
to find out. 
WOODROW WILSON AND RACE  
While Woodrow Wilson’s rather eclectic mixture of 
Christian theology proved central to his advocacy of 
progressive civilization, his notions of liberalism were 
also informed by his understanding of liberty and equality, 
which he measured in part through the lens of race. Hence 
Wilson’s perspectives on racial equality merit a brief 
overview and analysis.   
As a child of the South who came of age after the 
Civil War, Wilson possessed keenly-felt views on the 
subject of race. The trauma of the war gave way to dramatic 
shifts in race relations during the course of 
Reconstruction. In the wake of the Confederacy’s collapse, 
such changes were, of course, largely unwelcome in the 
South, producing additional anxiety and tension over the 
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respective roles and responsibilities of white and black 
Southerners. Not surprisingly, Wilson was extremely 
critical of Radical Reconstruction, believing Congressional 
proponents had recklessly disposed of President Abraham 
Lincoln’s moderate vision for reunification. Wilson viewed 
racial equality as unnatural, and therefore determined that 
Lincoln’s goal must have been to use the Thirteenth 
Amendment merely to emancipate the slaves, not to provide 
them with social or political equality among Whites. Wilson 
thus concluded that Radical Reconstruction was a travesty, 
an effort on the part of certain Northerners to destabilize 
and further weaken the South through social and racial 
revolution.
14
  
In his book, A History of the American People (1902), 
Wilson wrote the following: “It was a menace to society 
itself that the negroes should thus of a sudden be set free 
and left without tutelage or restraint.” Then, in 
conspiratorial fashion, he further suggested that radical 
Northerners “wished not only to give the negroes political 
privilege but also to put the white men of the South 
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resolutely under the negroes’ heels.” 15 Such statements 
reveal not only Wilson’s belief that Radical Reconstruction 
was harmful (and unconstitutional), but also his troubling 
sense of what a properly maintained, mutually beneficial 
social and racial hierarchy looked like in the South. For 
Wilson, segregationist protocols such as the Black Codes 
were positive, stabilizing social forces, allowing limited 
new freedoms to former slaves, while rightly preserving 
their subservient status to white southerners, who 
ostensibly would serve as social mentors to newly freed 
blacks. Wilson even rationalized the militant activities of 
the Ku Klux Klan (KKK) as necessary for the preservation of 
southern civilization, claiming the KKK was formed as 
something of a public service organization, forced to “take 
the law into their own hands.” Accordingly, argued Wilson, 
the KKK utilized intimidation tactics only because they 
were deprived of normal civil service mechanisms by the 
Radical Republican agenda.
16
 Ultimately, then, Wilson 
believed Reconstruction endangered the delicate racial 
balance of power throughout the South. To be sure, he took 
solace in the fact that Reconstruction was largely 
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unsuccessful by 1877, allowing segregation to remain and 
expand around the country. Nonetheless, Wilson’s memories 
of these traumatic events directly impacted his policies in 
later years.     
Of course Wilson did not limit his appraisals of race 
to domestic issues. In the 1880s, as a graduate student at 
Johns Hopkins University, Wilson studied under Professors 
Herbert Baxter Adams and Richard T. Ely, both of whom had 
completed their Ph.D. degrees in Germany, at the University 
of Heidelberg. Steeped in the philosophies of George 
Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Adams and Ely dutifully taught 
their students the intricacies of German historicism, 
including the so-called “germ theory.” 17 According to this 
line of thought, a nation’s development could be likened to 
biological processes in plant and animal kingdoms. Just as 
healthy plants germinated and grew from the rich soil, so 
to the strongest nations developed from the richest 
cultural roots. According to German historicism, those 
roots were, of course, Teutonic in nature.
18
  
From the start, Wilson was taken with this concept, 
merging Europe’s rich cultural heritage with a sense of 
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individual and collective fitness. It was not difficult for 
Wilson to trace America’s social and political lineage. He 
understood the European foundations better than most. 
However, he further identified the ideals of American and 
European culture with another crucial factor: race. He 
therefore distinguished between white European-based 
civilizations—perceived as the vanguard of modern 
liberalism—and those from Africa, Asia, and the Middle 
East, where race and ethnicity supposedly inhibited the 
pursuit of enlightened social and political virtues.
19
  
According to Wilson’s warped logic, then, it would 
seem that white people in Europe and North America rightly 
possessed a monopoly on the enlightened pursuit of 
democratic principles and liberal progressivism. He said as 
much in 1885, while writing about the virtues of democracy. 
For Wilson, the successful American political experiment 
was best explained by its origins “in our history, in our 
experience as a Teutonic race set apart to make a special 
character.” 20 Clearly, Wilson’s perceptions of inherent 
white superiority informed his approach to geo-politics, 
including matters of colonial policy, as will be shown.       
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ANGLO-SAXONISM AND SOCIAL DARWINISM  
Woodrow Wilson’s racist biases consequently affected 
his understanding and application of other ethno-cultural 
philosophies. Like many Americans of his generation, Wilson 
was quite taken with the idea that Western Civilization, 
dating at least as far back as the Greeks and Romans, was 
inherently superior to the rest of the world. A rather 
stark bias toward Anglo-Saxon culture was quite prominent 
in the United States.
21
 In certain ways, this seems strange, 
especially given the fact that the Angles and Saxons were 
historically distinctive to Britain’s modern cultural 
heritage rather than endemic to the rest of Europe and 
North America. However, the term Anglo-Saxon was (and is) 
often used to denote an association with Western 
Civilization more broadly. This certainly seems to have 
been Wilson’s typical application of the phrase.22 
The idea, of course, was that Western thought and 
culture was intrinsically more enlightened and advanced 
than cultures elsewhere. When Eurocentric gentlemen like 
                                                          
21 Alexander DeConde, Ethnicity, Race, and American Foreign Policy 
(Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1992), 86; Michael H. Hunt, The 
American Ascendancy (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 
2007), 59. 
22 For a wonderful collection of essays on the realities, contributions, 
and legacies of Anglo-Saxon culture, see David Clark and Nicholas 
Perkins, eds., Anglo-Saxon Culture and the Modern Imagination (London: 
Brewer Publishing, 2010), esp. essays 1-4. Regarding Wilson, see 
Confidential Journal, December 28, 1889, PWW, 6: 459-63. 
50 
Wilson surveyed the seminal Western traditions—in history, 
politics, philosophy, literature, poetry, music, and art, 
among others—they concluded that the Western cultural 
heritage was not merely impressive, but innately superior. 
Of course, they were right in their desire to affirm and 
preserve the virtues of Western knowledge that had been 
built up over the many centuries. It is, indeed, difficult 
to imagine a world without the phenomenally influential 
ideas of ancient philosophers like Plato and Aristotle, or 
more modern thinkers such as Immanuel Kant and Søren 
Kierkegaard. What might the modern world be without the 
pivotal engineering skills of the Romans or the exquisite 
images painted by Leonardo da Vinci, Michelangelo, and the 
like? The examples are numerous. Humanity has always been 
enriched by the best of Western Civilization to be sure.  
No, the philosophical flaws lay elsewhere for men, 
like Wilson, who accepted Anglo-Saxon superiority as truth. 
Especially insidious was the notion that the rest of the 
world had much less of value to offer. In identifying 
Western thought and culture as the most enlightened, the 
prevailing concept became that Westerners must be the 
purveyors of genuine knowledge, of truth, and of beauty. As 
pioneers of “advanced, technologically superior” 
51 
civilization, it seemed logical to conclude that the West 
had the right, even the responsibility, to introduce and 
foster these ostensibly superior notions to the “backward” 
peoples in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, among other 
territories.
23
 Still, such ideologies are difficult to 
rationalize and act upon without something more to go on 
than philosophical hyperbole based largely on culturally 
biased sentiments. There had to be something more, a sound 
logic that could be used to uphold and explain Western, 
Anglo-Saxon superiority. Wilson and thousands of other 
Westerners found just such an explanatory gift in the ideas 
of Charles Darwin and Herbert Spencer. 
The famed British naturalist, Charles Darwin, requires 
no introduction. His biological theories shook the world in 
1859 with the publication of On the Origin of Species, then 
again in 1871 with his more controversial work, The Descent 
of Man. Essentially, Darwin theorized that minor 
adaptations (sometimes called microevolution) within a 
species could be extrapolated over vast periods of time to 
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explain the major differences dividing taxonomic groups 
(sometimes called macroevolution).24 Darwinism was 
implacably naturalistic, explaining life’s origin and 
development by strictly natural, random causes. Perhaps the 
most crucial of these ideas was the theory of “natural 
selection,” whereby nature preserves traits that promote 
fitness and allow for the survival and advancement of a 
species.
25
     
As significant as Darwin’s theories were for 
biologists, it was the broad application of his ideas 
beyond the biological sciences that truly changed the 
world, often for the worse. A number of Charles Darwin’s 
Victorian contemporaries believed that “natural selection” 
could be used to explain not only the basic formation of 
biological organisms, but also every significant aspect of 
human thought and behavior. Herbert Spencer is perhaps the 
most famous of these. An English philosopher, politician, 
and sociologist, Spencer was an avid Darwinist, committed 
to explaining the entire human experience through a 
naturalistic lens. According to Spencer, human societies 
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and institutions were just like plants and animals in the 
sense that they were both formed by the process of natural 
selection, resulting in what he famously referred to as the 
“survival of the fittest.”26  
During the last two decades of the nineteenth century, 
Spencer was joined by a growing number of politicians, 
sociologists, and others, including William Graham Sumner 
and T. H. Huxley, in advocating for the broad application 
of Darwinian principles in explaining modern life, 
including basic social structures. These men assumed 
society was naturally evolving for the better. For cultural 
advancement to occur, each individual had to compete in the 
process of social evolution. Moreover, this freedom of 
competition was inviolable, and any interference—from the 
government or elsewhere—would conceivably be disastrous. 
Social Darwinism thus embraced a laissez-faire approach to 
government. Even if well-intentioned, by regulating 
business, taxation, housing, or even sanitation, the 
government would unwittingly be aiding the “unfit” and 
hindering societal progression.
27
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For Spencer, Sumner, Huxley, and a host of others, 
successful business magnates and their corporations were 
presumed to be the “engines” of social progress. If 
smaller, entrepreneurial businesses were marginalized or 
destroyed by trusts and monopolies, they had no basis for a 
grievance. After all, such outcomes were viewed as natural 
parts of the evolutionary process. Moreover, Spencer and 
his compatriots believed that Darwinian explanations were 
not only sound rationales for existing class structures, 
but also liberating propositions, allowing the different 
classes to recognize the nominally concrete logic of 
science as an unbiased, impersonal explanation. In essence 
the disenfranchised classes should simply accept their 
natural place in society and live more harmoniously, at 
least according to the warped logic of Spencer.
28
   
The use of Darwinism to promote such a rugged 
individualist, “every man for himself” approach to human 
civilization was challenged by a precious few in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. By the time of 
his election to the presidency in 1912, Wilson had long 
been a philosophical adherent of the disturbing logic; in 
fact, he was a practitioner. It seemed to be a perfect 
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underpinning for the Anglo-Saxon elitism that many, like 
Wilson and Edward House, embraced.
29
  
An additional, equally crucial element of Wilson’s 
philosophical/intellectual framework proved enormously 
important during and after World War I. For while Wilson 
embraced Anglo-Saxon superiority and rationalized it 
through elements of Social Darwinist thought, he also 
believed that the United States existed as a providential 
experiment, uniquely gifted to carry out its civilizing 
mission to the world. For Wilson, America was truly 
exceptional.   
THE IMPULSE OF AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM 
At present, in the second decade of the twenty-first 
century, globalization is widely embraced and many parts of 
the world are coming together despite the considerable 
cultural and geographic distances. Emerging communication 
technologies, shared commercial interests, and a greater 
sense of geo-political interdependence typically elicit 
much positive feedback from postmodern Americans. Given 
this cross-cultural milieu, one might naturally assume that 
an elitist, condescending, and divisive philosophy such as 
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American exceptionalism would be increasingly unwelcome. Of 
course, much of the world is, indeed, wary of the United 
States. Yet many Americans still gravitate toward the 
belief that they are part of something special, a singular 
cultural and political environment that nurtures and 
insulates, even as it seeks to broaden its impact through 
the projection of power.
30
   
American exceptionalism is based on two key notions: 
that America possesses a unique cultural heritage and 
therefore must act upon a special set of responsibilities, 
including the projection of inherent virtues such as the 
concepts of liberty, equality, and republican democracy. 
The philosophy has deep roots in our culture, stretching 
all the way back to the early colonial period. In his 1630 
sermon, “A Model of Christian Charity,” John Winthrop, a 
founder of the Massachusetts Bay Colony, famously outlined 
his prescription for building a Puritan society that would 
remain dedicated to the Christian faith despite the many 
obstacles the Puritans were likely to encounter in the New 
World.  
                                                          
30 Andrew J. Bacevich, The Limits of Power: The End of American 
Exceptionalism (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2008), 18-21, and 
American Empire: The Realities and Consequences of U.S. Diplomacy 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2002). 
57 
Winthrop took as his inspiration the biblical passage 
from the book of Matthew known as the “Sermon on the 
Mount,” in which Jesus presents the central tenets of 
discipleship eventually formalized in Christianity. In 
Matthew 5:14-16, speaking to the Galilean crowd as well as 
his own disciples, Jesus says: 
You are the light of the world. A city that is set on 
a hill cannot be hidden. Nor do they light a lamp and 
put it under a basket, but on a lampstand, and it 
gives light to all who are in the house. Let your 
light so shine before men, that they may see your good 
works and glorify your Father in heaven.
31
 
 
In his own sermon, Winthrop encouraged his fellow 
Puritans to unify and conform to their stated doctrines, 
not only for the sake of their own piety, but also because 
there was a higher, yet practical calling. He characterized 
the Puritans’ colonial endeavor as part of a unique 
spiritual covenant with God, whereby the Massachusetts Bay 
Colony would be as a “city upon a hill,” modeling unity and 
Christian charity to others.
32
 
 John Winthrop’s sermons and writings were not widely 
read during the seventeenth century. Thus his voice was not 
a clarion call for change during his own lifetime or those 
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of succeeding generations.
 33
 Moreover, in truth, Winthrop 
should not be shackled with the burdensome chains of a 
philosophy he neither invented nor advocated. He was not 
the progenitor of American exceptionalism any more than 
Friedrich Nietszche was the founder of Nazism. A close 
reading of Winthrop’s collection of sermons and other 
pieces indicates the Massachusetts Bay leader did not 
envision a broad, aggressive pursuit of the “city upon a 
hill,” in which other American colonies (at the time), 
neighboring territories, or nations were forced to adopt 
and practice Puritanism as he or his fellow colonists from 
Massachusetts Bay prescribed. His was a rather more 
restrained, even elegant, appeal for shared unity and 
purpose in a community of like-minded people. Winthrop’s 
“city upon a hill” was not intended to alter the world 
through force of action against others, but rather by 
consistently modeling its virtues in ways that inspired 
others to do the same.
34
 
 While he likely would have been surprised by the 
trend, over time John Winthrop became one of the more 
revered early American colonial leaders. In the wake of the 
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American Revolution, Winthrop’s views gained recognition 
because of the presumably patriotic quality of his words. 
By the mid-to-late nineteenth century, his once-obscure 
sermons and social philosophies were being read and 
analyzed by scores of politicians and scholars. It is not a 
coincidence that the key rationales for “Manifest Destiny” 
in the 1840s drew heavily from the righteous-sounding 
ideological phrases found in Winthrop.
35
 
 As an American born in the mid-nineteenth century, as 
one who came of age during the decades of unrivaled 
industrial and economic expansion, Woodrow Wilson adopted 
American exceptionalism much like his contemporaries.
36
 He 
read Winthrop, along with many others of the same ilk. Over 
time, the exceptional qualities of the American character 
seemed like foregone conclusions, easily identifiable to 
Wilson. After all, how else could America’s rise to 
prominence be explained if not by a unique capacity for 
overcoming immense obstacles in order to secure its 
republican vision. Not only had Americans achieved 
independence by defeating a great European power, they had 
also swept across the continent from east to west, and even 
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fought and survived a cataclysmic civil war. By the last 
decade of the nineteenth century, it seemed America and its 
citizens were poised for greatness.  
A number of like-minded colleagues and acquaintances 
shared Wilson’s assessment of the reasons for America’s 
rise to prominence as well as its future destiny. Their 
mutual support of one another not only inspired confidence 
through discussion and debate; in Wilson’s case, such 
collaborations often proved to be the genesis of future 
policy. Perhaps the most important and influential was the 
famous historian, Frederick Jackson Turner, with whom 
Wilson struck up a friendship. Turner, of course, went on 
to fame as one of the leading American historians of the 
early twentieth century, first at the University of 
Wisconsin (1890–1910), and then at Harvard (1911–1924). An 
exceptionalist in his own right, Turner valued the 
Princeton scholar’s opinion highly, and in fact asked 
Wilson to read and critique early drafts of his famous 
“frontier thesis,” a sprawling critique of the frontier’s 
defining impact on American identity. It was an 
exceptionalist vision through and through.
37
 
                                                          
37 Wilson, “The Significance of American History,” PWW, 12: 184; 
Frederick Jackson Turner, “The Significance of the Frontier in American 
61 
THE RESULTING WILSONIAN PROGRESSIVISM 
Woodrow Wilson believed all of American history was to 
be interpreted within these essential philosophical 
frameworks. In conjunction with his applied understanding 
of Christianity, race, Anglo-Saxonism, and Social 
Darwinism, Wilson’s dedication to the idea of an 
exceptional American heritage and purpose led him to 
advocate and pursue a rather unique brand of progressivism, 
one that often differed from his contemporaries. Typical 
progressives were, like Wilson, Caucasian, middle-class 
idealists, though they included both Republican and 
Democratic advocates. Most were broadly concerned with 
addressing the abuses of power prominent in local political 
machines, while instituting practical, efficient, and 
ethical government protocols. They sought to reform and 
regulate politics and business in the pursuit of a variety 
of social justice causes, including ending child labor, 
implementing safety regulations for the American worker, 
prohibiting the sale of alcohol, curtailing the corporate 
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trusts, and endorsing women’s suffrage, among other 
pursuits.
38
  
Wilson the reformer and progressive seemed incongruous 
with these objectives. Even seemingly like-minded 
progressives often failed to understand Wilson’s approach 
as president to social and political reform in America. At 
times, he seemed like a run-of-the-mill progressive. For 
instance, he was an anti-trust advocate and oversaw the 
establishment of the Federal Reserve System in the United 
States. However, while embracing traditional progressivism 
in many respects, Wilson was atypical in other ways during 
his two terms. In pursuing his social and political vision, 
the president drew heavily from his understanding of 
progressive history, precisely defined by 1) Christianity, 
2) race, 3) Anglo-Saxonism, 4) Social Darwinism, and 5) 
American exceptionalism.
39
  
If contemporaries had fully comprehended the impulses 
that ruled Wilson, they likely would have been far less 
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surprised by his domestic philosophies and programs.
40
 
Though he targeted the trusts, rightly believing they 
undermined entrepreneurial competition, his New Freedom 
program was designed to ensure less federal oversight in 
business, and therefore less intervention. He also opposed 
many social justice programs, consistently withholding his 
support for causes such as child labor reform and women’s 
suffrage.
41
  
To the twenty-first century mind, these notions seem 
anything but progressive. Yet once Wilson’s underlying 
philosophical foundations are understood and acknowledged, 
it is possible to achieve greater objectivity in critiquing 
the policies, disturbing as they may be. For starters, on 
issues of race, President Wilson the progressive 
consistently failed to support black Americans in their 
fight for equality and upward social mobility in the early 
twentieth century. Wilson the wily politician may have 
promised increased measures of equality for African 
Americans, but such rhetorical posturing belied his true 
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feelings on the matter.
42
 Of course, Wilson did not consider 
his own views to be contradictory. He believed in inspiring 
black Americans by promising them a better future, with 
greater access to social and economic privilege in America. 
Ironically, however, the upward mobility sought by W.E.B. 
DuBois and other black leaders required, among other 
things, broad access for African Americans to the realm of 
politics, local and national. Yet Wilson was unwilling to 
seriously consider providing blacks with access to the 
corridors of political power in the United States.
43
 In 
essence, he and his fellow white politicians viewed 
themselves as the self-appointed guardians of civic virtue. 
Hence, for the president, the phrase “racial equality” was 
a misnomer in most respects. 
Consider Wilson’s responses to several issues of race 
prior to and during his presidency. As white Americans 
plowed through the southwest in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries, indigenous as well as Mexican-
based cultures were virtually destroyed in favor of white, 
supposedly “Christian” culture. More accurately viewed as 
blatant imperialism than a true Christian mission, these 
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episodes were largely praised by Wilson as essential to the 
formation of a “unified nation and people.”44  
Persecution of black Americans was endemic in the 
South during Wilson’s presidency. Yet his administration 
failed to acknowledge the need for even minimal safeguards 
against heinous crimes such as lynchings, which were common 
in many southern states. Wilson was appropriately disturbed 
by these ongoing murders. Even so, he refused to sanction 
direct intervention, viewing lynchings as unfortunate 
byproducts of the magnified racial animosities stirred up 
during Reconstruction.
45
  
Of course, Wilson’s views on race were not limited to 
domestic affairs. During and after the Spanish-American War 
of 1898, then Professor Wilson was thrilled by the notion 
of acquiring the Philippines as an American “protectorate.” 
Here was a tailor-made opportunity for the United States. 
Assuming the Filipinos both desired and needed change, 
Wilson anticipated providing the “foreigners” with social, 
political, and spiritual guidance, allowing the Philippines 
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to eventually leave behind their “regressive” cultural 
standards and join the ranks of enlightened civilizations.
46
  
Wilson’s views on race were consistent with his belief 
in Social Darwinism. In that sense, his domestic reform 
agenda aligned with the notion that the federal 
government’s responsibilities to the average citizen were 
actually quite limited, and that federal law should 
encourage the competitive realities suggested by Darwin’s 
process of “natural selection” and Spencer’s “survival of 
the fittest” mantra. Again, according to this thinking, by 
interfering with business or supporting the “unfit,” the 
government ran the risk of unwittingly destroying, or at 
least inhibiting, social progress. 
WILSON AND THE PRINCIPLE OF NATIONAL SELF-DETERMINATION 
When Wilsonian progressivism was applied to the arena 
of international relations, the consequences were many. 
Hence a brief contextual understanding of Wilson’s true 
notions of independence is essential. When referring to the 
principle of national self-determination, most modern 
scholars use some variant of the following definition 
supplied by Alfred Cobban, a pioneering scholar on the 
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subject. Cobban defined national self-determination as “the 
right of a nation to constitute an independent state and 
determine its own government for itself.”47 Implicit in this 
definition is the idea of sovereignty, the notion that each 
nation state is inherently capable of formulating civil 
structures and practicing self-government. 
However, the crucial issue for this study is whether 
Wilson understood national self-determination to be an 
inherent, universal right. The answer is, unfortunately, 
no. In reality, Wilson viewed the principle of national 
self-determination through a very restrictive lens, based 
largely upon his long-standing commitment to historicism. 
As previously indicated, Wilson’s historicist views were 
both traditional and progressive in nature, steeped in 
Common Sense Realism Christianity, racism, Anglo-Saxonism, 
and Social Darwinism. Moreover, he understood America’s 
exceptional democratic strengths as historically 
derivative, arising from a shared national consciousness 
and experience over the course of successive generations. 
In explaining this idea, Wilson suggested that “no people 
can be a nation before its time, and its time has not come 
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until the national thought and feeling have been developed 
and have become prevalent. Until a people thinks its 
government national it is not national.”48 
Not surprisingly, according to Woodrow Wilson, the key 
historical proving ground for Americans had been the Civil 
War, which, through traumatic circumstances, unified and 
ultimately strengthened the American commitment to shared 
civic principles and to national government. Hence, for 
Wilson, the strength of American democracy by the early 
twentieth century was based upon a natural historical 
progression, which he defined as a process of “organic 
development” that over time produced a truly democratic 
nation.
49
 In a startling critique coming from a southerner 
in the 1880s, Wilson affirmed President Abraham Lincoln’s 
handling of the Civil War, namely because Wilson believed 
Lincoln rightly valued the preservation of national unity. 
In his dogged pursuit of reunification, Lincoln had 
therefore saved the nation and its government, affirming 
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and preserving the founding virtues conveyed by Thomas 
Jefferson in the Declaration of Independence.
50
  
As a politician, Wilson understood and applied the 
principle of national self-determination based largely upon 
his critique of shared, defining historical events like the 
Civil War. In essence, he argued that many nations were not 
genuinely prepared for independence and self-government, 
especially of a democratic nature. In fact, even if certain 
groups claimed the right to self-government, any lack of 
homogeneity would prove detrimental to the effort. Said 
Wilson, it was imprudent to label “a miscellaneous people, 
unknit, scattered, diverse of race and speech and habit, a 
nation, a community.” In other words, according to Woodrow 
Wilson, racial and ethnic uniformity ensured greater 
success when it came to shared national consciousness and 
purpose.
51
   
As a result, Wilson believed that the ideal 
independent, self-governing nations achieved their status 
only after long, often trying periods of time, apparently 
because the unifying bonds required to promote cultural 
fitness were slow to progress. Initially distinct and self-
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serving demographic groups presumably required generations 
before they could see beyond their own myopic desires and 
become part of a larger societal whole. This was even more 
important for democracies, which required a greater sense 
of shared vision, at least according to Wilson’s 
questionable logic on the matter. Regardless, these 
historicist notions were, indeed, crucial in the formation 
of Wilson’s ideas regarding national self-determination.52   
As will become apparent in chapters four and five of 
this study, the Wilsonian approach to the principle of 
national self-determination became the basis for American 
colonial policy, ensuring that various indigenous groups 
desiring independence and self-government were deemed 
“unfit” and “ill-prepared,” lacking the historically 
progressive, unifying features that Woodrow Wilson favored. 
His liberal internationalist vision may have been directed 
toward altering the traditional colonial structures. 
However, as in the case of his domestic progressivism, when 
applied to colonial affairs, Wilson’s historicism, as well 
as his religious, ethnocentric, and nationalist prejudices 
limited his ability to grasp the legitimate claims of non-
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white, non-European peoples concerning their own futures. 
When viewed within this context, Wilson’s notions regarding 
the Mandate System reveal not only the president’s, but the 
overall U.S. position in a completely different light. The 
next chapter will introduce the focus of this study, Edward 
M. House, and characterize his progressive impulses, which 
were closely aligned with Wilson’s. I will then turn to the 
origins of the Mandate System concept and analyze House’s 
role in overseeing The Inquiry, beginning in 1917.  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
EDWARD M. HOUSE’S PROGRESSIVISM AND THE ORIGINS OF THE 
MANDATES CONCEPT  
  
The United States government’s role in formulating the 
Mandate System was important, beginning with the Wilson 
administration’s concerted efforts to create a working 
blueprint for the postwar colonial world in 1917. Many have 
received credit for conceiving and molding the mandates, 
including Woodrow Wilson himself, South Africa’s Jan 
Christian Smuts, as well as their European counterparts at 
the Paris Peace Conference. However, a group of American 
scholars and statesmen formed in 1917, known as The 
Inquiry, was also critical in the broad development of 
postwar initiatives, including those affecting the colonial 
world. The head of The Inquiry was none other than Wilson’s 
close friend and advisor, Edward M. House.  
However, before analyzing The Inquiry’s work leading 
up to the Paris Peace Conference, an overview of House’s 
life and career prior to 1917 will be instructive. In 
truth, he came to advocate a brand of progressivism 
remarkably similar to Wilson’s. Like his friend, House was 
a southerner, possessing an ingrained, keenly-felt sense of 
white, Anglo-Saxon superiority. He was a committed 
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Darwinist, who believed that Western nations were called to 
“civilize” the world and promote human evolution. And 
though he was certainly a proud Texan, House was also a 
full-fledged American exceptionalist. Hence, to comprehend 
the genesis of his beliefs, a sound understanding of 
House’s formative years is essential, as is a comprehension 
of his intellectual foundations and his early political 
experience as a “kingmaker” in Texas.     
FORMATIVE EXPERIENCES 
Born in Houston, Texas, on July 26, 1858, Edward 
Mandell House belonged to one of the wealthiest, most 
prominent families in the state. His father, Thomas William 
House, had amassed an enormous fortune through the family’s 
extensive cotton and sugar plantations. By the time of the 
Civil War, the senior House was also making inroads in the 
banking industry, expanding the family’s wealth in a new 
arena. Interestingly, from 1861 to 1865, Thomas House 
prospered further by allowing a small fleet of his ships to 
serve as blockade runners, which proved a precarious, 
though highly profitable enterprise. The vessels smashed 
through Union lines to deliver commodities such as cotton 
to Europe and returned carrying valuable provisions, 
including munitions that were, in turn, sold to the 
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Confederacy. At war’s end, the House family emerged as one 
of the wealthiest in Texas at a time when many aristocratic 
southern families were either struggling or crippled 
financially.
1
  
Edward House came of age after the war ended, during 
the latter stages of Reconstruction, which proved some of 
the most tumultuous, challenging years in southern history. 
Texas in the 1860s and 1870s was exciting to be sure, but 
it was also a volatile place to live and raise a family. 
There is little to go on concerning the young House’s 
relationship with his parents. His mother, Mary Hearn 
House, died when he was in his early teens, and it seems 
that he and his siblings were largely raised by nannies. 
What time they spent with their parents appears to have 
been devoted to rather formal interactions, in which father 
and mother would inquire about the basic well-being of 
their children, perhaps to ensure they were reasonably 
well-adjusted. This is not to say that Mr. and Mrs. House 
did not love or care for their children, but merely that 
the intimate, emotional bonds were somewhat less defined 
and prioritized in the House family. Among other things, 
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instructing their children in matters of personal morality, 
religion, philosophy, politics, and culture was largely 
left to other adults or the natural accumulation of 
personal experience.
2
  
Thus, in sharp contrast to Wilson, whose intellectual 
foundations were deeply influenced by his parents, House 
came to rely on his older siblings or himself when it came 
to the formative virtues. While such parental aloofness may 
seem rather absurd in the early twenty-first century, it 
was widely practiced in the late nineteenth, especially 
among the aristocracy. Moreover, it is important to note 
that Thomas House was not completely removed from the lives 
of his children, especially after their mother’s untimely 
death, at least according to Edward House’s diary entries 
during his late teen years. In these, he repeatedly 
acknowledges his father’s pride and encouraging words, and 
specifically credits House senior with instilling in his 
sons a vital understanding of international economics and 
corporate (or estate) finance.
3
   
 Edward House was deeply affected by the people he 
encountered and the events he witnessed prior to 1880, 
                                                          
2 “Reminiscences,” 1-2, House Papers, Yale. See also Godfrey Hodgson, 
Woodrow Wilson’s Right Hand: The Life of Colonel Edward M. House (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 2006), 18-20. 
3 Ibid.  
76 
though many of his formative worldviews were shaped less by 
parents and teachers than by his siblings and boyhood 
friends. Physically frail throughout his life, House 
continually struggled with bouts of malaria, among other 
ailments, but he was especially sickly as a child. And yet 
he pursued a remarkably active, even robust lifestyle for 
someone so infirm. Perhaps one reason is that he spent a 
great deal of time with his brash, adventurous brother, 
James, whom the younger Edward idolized. In their youth, 
the two House boys, “Jimmie” and “Ed,” wreaked havoc, 
constantly pitting themselves against one another, as well 
as their friends, in harrowing feats of recklessness to 
pass the time and achieve the rites of passage common for 
boys of the postwar South. Left to their own devices, 
however, the boys’ activities often degenerated into 
shockingly violent acts of aggression or retribution, such 
as bullying unfortunate youngsters they did not like. On 
one occasion, they even hanged a fellow schoolmate from a 
tree until he turned purple before cutting him free. James 
tragically died at sixteen from a brain injury due to a 
fall.
4
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To be sure, there was a great deal of violence going 
around. Steeped in war-weary frustration, and resentment 
toward the North, southern states like Texas were awash in 
chaos and bloodshed. To a degree, House and his boyhood 
playmates were simply copying the adults in their spheres 
of influence. Reconstruction was as controversial in Texas 
as in other southern states. Often, northern policies and 
politicians were not well-received. For instance, 
encouraged by the presence of U.S. Army troops in the 
South, freed slaves and northern “carpetbaggers” frequently 
moved in and seized control of local and state government 
structures, hoping to initiate and enforce widespread 
political reform. This famously happened in Houston in 
1873. However, before the newcomers could consolidate their 
authority, a disturbing sequence of riots, shootings, and 
lynchings followed, initiated by Houston’s native, white 
residents, some of whom were aristocrats like the Houses. 
Such turmoil became all too familiar in the 1860s and 
1870s.
5
 
Urged on by his siblings and friends, the young Edward 
House seems to have possessed a rather sadistic streak. 
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Even worse, violent interactions were not limited to white 
acquaintances in Houston and Galveston. House and his 
companions often harassed recently freed blacks, either 
verbally or otherwise. He recalled using slingshots, or 
“nigger shooters,” to pelt free black passersby with 
objects ranging from stones to shards of glass.
6
  
House’s diary entries throughout his teen years 
consistently reveal a deeply-felt racism, a sense of Anglo-
Saxon superiority and pride, which is not overly surprising 
given his southern upbringing in the late nineteenth 
century.
7
 Establishing this psychological and behavioral 
pattern is vital because it confirms that racist notions, 
culturally ingrained as they may have been, featured 
prominently in House’s psyche from a young age. There are 
no indications that House was later involved in formal 
groups like the Ku Klux Klan in Texas; nor was he 
particularly vocal about his racism in public by the time 
of his political partnership with Wilson, though it seems 
likely that both men learned the political importance of 
curbing their racist views for public consumption. The 
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point is that, when measuring House’s clear partiality for 
Anglo-Saxon civilization and his demeaning, manipulative 
proposals for colonial peoples, such views appear quite 
consistent with the racist ideologies learned in his youth.   
In some respects, the young House thrived in the 
chaotic environment of Reconstruction-era Texas. His 
aforementioned social experiences instilled in him a sense 
of self-reliance and confidence, an ability to measure the 
harsh realities of the surrounding world and resolve 
personal disputes with direct force when possible, or by 
compromising when necessary in pursuit of self-interest. 
These resolute abilities were later used in quite different 
ways, as House gradually learned to combine such traits 
with his passion for the demanding world of politics and 
diplomacy. 
INTELLECTUAL FOUNDATIONS AND POLITICAL ENGAGEMENT  
Though his social experiences dominated much of his 
early life, House’s education also played an important role 
in his developing worldview. He was a capable, though 
unspectacular, student during the years of his formal 
education. His physical limitations may have played a role, 
because he was frequently forced to curtail his physical 
activities and rest while his body recuperated from the 
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most recent ailment. At such times, he gave himself over to 
reading, a favorite pastime throughout his life. As an 
adult, he was a voracious reader in a surprisingly broad 
range of subjects. Early on, he enjoyed adventure novels 
like many boys his age, though he embraced some classical 
literature and history as well.
8
  
The tumultuous nature of Texas politics in the 1870s 
particularly intrigued the young man, and from his early 
teen years forward he subsequently expanded his interests 
into the broader subject of American politics. Even as he 
struggled to retain an interest in other subjects, the 
realm of politics consistently held his attention. He 
attended a number of schools over the years, including the 
Houston Academy, a school in Bath, England, while the House 
family was living overseas for a year, and lastly two 
preparatory schools in Virginia. In each case, House 
frequently conveyed frustration at having to learn 
mathematical formulas, poetry, or Latin, but wrote quite 
favorably of his history and civics courses.
9
 
In 1875, at age seventeen, Edward House was hoping to 
enter Yale and prepare for a possible career in either law 
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or politics, but was rejected when his performance on the 
entrance examination proved less than stellar. Apparently, 
hunting in the woods and bullying in town had occupied an 
inordinately high percentage of House’s energies over the 
years, at the expense of his academic preparation. Though 
Yale’s president, Dr. Noah Porter, was a friend of Thomas 
House, he was not willing to allow the younger House 
admittance, at least not until he addressed his academic 
shortcomings.
10
  
Hence, House was referred to the nearby Hopkins 
Grammar School in New Haven, Connecticut, in the hope that 
a year or two of additional preparation in Latin, Greek, 
and the classics would prepare him for the rigors of Yale. 
At Hopkins, he did study when absolutely necessary, though 
he also appears to have shirked some of his academic 
responsibilities in favor of pranks and mildly degenerate 
behavior whenever possible. More importantly, however, it 
was at Hopkins that House befriended Oliver Morton, the son 
of a U.S. Senator from Indiana. They shared a deep, abiding 
fascination with American politics, and the two became 
inseparable. On frequent occasions, the two young men 
                                                          
10 “Reminiscences,” 5-6, House Papers, Yale. See also Hodgson, Woodrow 
Wilson’s Right Hand, 19-20.  
82 
visited the Morton residence in Washington, D.C., where 
House was not only introduced to Senator Morton, but also 
other senators and representatives, and even President 
Ulysses S. Grant. During the notorious 1876 election 
campaign, Senator Morton lost the Republican presidential 
nomination to Rutherford B. Hayes, who went on to become 
president after one of the closest elections in history. 
Regardless, the experiences with Morton’s family galvanized 
House’s interest in politics, and he seemed, at last, ready 
to take the next step toward a prominent future.
11
 
Instead of Yale, both House and Morton chose Cornell 
University, in Ithaca, New York. It was here that House 
initially became enamored of several crucial concepts that 
would have a lasting influence on his life and career: 
Social Darwinism, Anglo-Saxonism, and the roots of his 
American exceptionalist framework. Applying Charles 
Darwin’s biological theories to culture more broadly was 
intriguing to House, whose fondness for British and 
American culture was steeped in notions of white, Anglo-
Saxon superiority. He previously lacked a fully-formed 
philosophy that seemed to logically explain Western 
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Civilization’s dominance in the world. By the late 1870s, 
however, there were strong arguments coming from Europeans 
like Herbert Spencer, as well as others in the United 
States, proclaiming the virtues of the strong over the 
weak, virtues that were at least ostensibly based in modern 
science. In 1877-1878, several of his professors at Cornell 
were explaining, even advocating these ideas in some 
detail. Like Wilson and many others, House became convinced 
that Social Darwinism was a thoroughly sound, even 
practical rationale for Anglo-Saxon cultural superiority, a 
notion that would deeply influence his later articulations 
of American colonial objectives.
12
 
The broad idea of American exceptionalism came more 
gradually to House, partially because, as a Texan, he was 
conditioned to favor the Lone Star Republic over the United 
States in considerations of loyalty. Still, because of his 
genuine appreciation for American history and politics, the 
seeds of the exceptionalist framework had already been 
sown. While this notion remained largely dormant for House 
until the early twentieth century, Cornell challenged him 
to consider the possibility that Americans possessed a 
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uniquely extraordinary heritage, one that virtually 
demanded a projection of their political and cultural 
structures associated with national greatness.
13
  
Though House did not distinguish himself at Cornell as 
an elite mind, in truth he appears to have grown immensely, 
imbibing a far more mature, serious approach to knowledge 
than ever before. Unfortunately, his time at Cornell proved 
short-lived. In the fall of 1879, during House’s second 
year at the university, tragedy struck when Thomas House 
suffered a debilitating stroke. Edward left Cornell, 
returning to Texas in the hopes of nursing his father back 
to proper health. Though the senior House initially seemed 
to make a few strides toward some measure of recovery, it 
was not long before his health worsened to the point of 
crisis, and he died in early 1880.
14
 
Upon reflecting on his possible courses of action, 
House decided not to return to complete his degree at 
Cornell, nor did he pursue a law career, though he briefly 
considered entering the Columbia Law School in New York. 
Ultimately, he settled in Texas and took over the reins of 
his father’s estate, proving himself a rather capable 
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manager. In addition to overseeing the House family 
fortune, his primary responsibilities included buying and 
selling vast tracts of property throughout the state, 
pitting his business acumen against other real estate 
developers, many of whom possessed far more knowledge and 
experience than the young House. To his credit, he was 
remarkably adept at closing deals and earning the respect 
of both partners and competitors alike.
15
  
These were good years for House to be sure. In late 
1880, he met the lovely Loulie Hunter, herself the daughter 
of an aristocratic family, from Hunter, Texas, no less. 
They married in August 1881, and then embarked on a year-
long tour of Europe.
16
 Upon their return to Texas, House 
continued in his business venture as before, until 1882. He 
longed for something else, something more suited to his 
personality and interests. In truth, he clearly longed for 
a role in politics, though he was forced to acknowledge 
some difficult truths about himself, truths that ultimately 
defined his life and career from that point on. In 
particular, House came to realize that he would likely 
never be able to assume high political office himself, as a 
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governor, senator, or certainly as president. His frail 
health continually plagued him, and he rightly questioned 
his physical ability to discharge the very public 
responsibilities of elected officials.
17
  
Based on his diary entries beginning in 1882, House 
appears to have been at peace with these realizations.
18
 He 
had always been comfortable in the background, dating back 
to his childhood when he played second-fiddle to his 
brother James. House was not charismatic, nor was he overly 
striking physically. Moreover, he was not a very capable 
public speaker. All of these traits appear to have come 
crashing in on House’s consciousness as he considered 
whether he had a future in politics. In the end, the 
psychological resolution was a rather simple one. House 
ultimately decided that he actually would be far more 
effective as a political advisor, as a “hidden hand” that 
guided the thoughts and actions of the powerful.                   
MAKING OF A WILSONIAN PROGRESSIVE (1892–1912) 
In 1886, House and his wife relocated to the Texas 
state capital of Austin. On most evenings, they either 
entertained guests at their palatial new home, or they 
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hobnobbed elsewhere at parties with the state’s elite 
business leaders and politicians. Because of the honorable 
reputation and legacy of Thomas House, his son benefited 
immediately, and it was not long before he succeeded in 
ingratiating himself to a vast circle of elite, powerful 
acquaintances.
19
  
But his family name and connections did not entirely 
account for his early successes. House was also a quick 
study, and he poured himself into this self-prescribed 
internship, devouring the often sordid complexities of the 
political arena in Texas, especially those of the 
Democratic Party that he favored. As one account put it, 
House became deeply interested in learning “all aspects of 
the art of manipulating men.”20 Whether it involved 
understanding voter trends in the state, measuring 
nomination tendencies at party conventions, or even 
learning how to manipulate legislative bodies to pass a 
desired bill, House vigorously pursued his hands-on 
political education. And by the early 1890s, he deemed 
himself ready to test his ideas and skills in the crucible 
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of Texas politics, though his initial foray proved 
challenging.
21
 
In 1892, the incumbent Texas governor, James W. Hogg, 
faced a staunch challenge for the Democratic nomination 
from George Clark, a well-funded party rival whose 
political sponsors included the managing directors of the 
Southern Pacific Railroad. As it happened, Governor Hogg 
found himself in the crosshairs of the railroad company 
because he vigorously opposed monopolistic practices and 
had devoted much time and energy to regulating the 
railroad’s activities in the state. Hence his political 
future seemed grim.
22
  
Enter Edward House, who in this matter aligned himself 
politically with moderate reformers of the era, many of 
whom spawned the progressivism of the early twentieth 
century. Although he had yet to articulate some of these 
principles, like Wilson in later years, House actually came 
to favor less government oversight of business, in line 
with his views on the applications of Social Darwinism to 
government, specifically in the economic realm. At least in 
part, House already seemed to be gravitating toward the 
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idea that the federal government’s oversight should 
actually be quite limited, preferring instead to encourage 
the competitive realities suggested by Darwin’s process of 
“natural selection” and Spencer’s “survival of the 
fittest.” Again, according to this thinking, by interfering 
with business or supporting the “unfit,” the government ran 
the risk of unwittingly destroying, or at least inhibiting 
social progress.
23
 Even so, House did believe that overly 
large, aggressive business monopolies undermined the very 
entrepreneurial competition required to ensure economic 
fitness. Hence he opposed the Southern Pacific Railroad in 
this instance. 
After offering to aid Governor Hogg in his time of 
critical need, House served, by his own choice, behind-the-
scenes as the governor’s key political advisor. After 
defeating Clark for the Democratic nomination, Hogg won the 
1892 election, and afterward gave much credit to House for 
his insightful advice on matters of campaign finance and 
legislative reform, among other issues. Moreover, in 
partial thanks to House, Hogg also bestowed upon his young 
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advisor the honorary title of “Colonel,” which remained a 
preferred moniker for the remainder of House’s life.24 
Over the next sixteen years, Colonel House was an 
intimate, though unofficial advisor to four consecutive 
Texas governors, including Hogg, Charles Culberson, Joseph 
Sayers, and W. H. D. Lanham. In that time, a number of 
progressive philosophies emerged in House that bore a 
striking resemblance to those of his future friend and 
colleague, Woodrow Wilson. House’s brand of progressivism 
was steeped in the racist notions of Anglo-Saxonism and 
Social Darwinism. Moreover, by the first decade of the 
twentieth century, House, too, had increasingly accepted 
American exceptionalism as an explanatory framework.
25
 Given 
his own meteoric rise in the realm of power politics in the 
United States, such philosophies seemed quite rational to 
the Texas “colonel,” whose political career seemed to 
mirror the inexorable American rise to global prominence. 
By late 1910, House was seeking a greater political 
challenge, preferably as an advisor to a politician of 
national significance. At this juncture, Wilson remained a 
somewhat obscure political “dark horse” on the national 
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stage. Though elected as New Jersey’s governor in November 
of that year, Wilson had yet to move beyond the shadow of 
his academic career to become a visionary politician. 
Still, House recognized in Wilson the essential qualities 
of a strong, capable leader. And by late 1911, he was 
convinced that Wilson’s progressive vision was superior to 
that of other likely presidential candidates, so House 
decided to arrange a meeting with Governor Wilson.
26
  
The two met for the first time at the Hotel Gotham in 
New York City, on November 24, 1911. By all accounts, they 
liked one another immediately, perhaps sensing the 
possibilities that a political partnership might produce. 
Even more importantly, after weeks of meeting and 
discussing a vast array of political ideas, the two men 
realized they shared a surprising number of philosophical 
tenets, paving the way for one of American history’s most 
productive political collaborations. During the election 
year of 1912, House remained in the background as one of 
Wilson’s unofficial campaign advisors. By the time of 
Wilson’s victory in November and the beginning of his first 
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term in March of 1913, the two men were together often; in 
fact they seemed inseparable.
27
             
THE INQUIRY AND INITIAL COLONIAL QUESTIONS 
Colonel House, as he preferred to be addressed, served 
President Wilson in a variety of capacities from 1913 to 
1917. Though he lacked an official role within the 
administration, House was, nonetheless, part of Wilson’s 
inner circle. Over time, he earned the implicit trust of 
the president regarding a wide array of political matters, 
both foreign and domestic. As Wilson’s most trusted 
confidant and advisor, House advised him on a remarkably 
wide range of topics, from effective modes of political 
dialogue with challenging personalities in the U.S. 
Congress to detailed suggestions for Wilson’s New Freedom 
program. Yet he displayed a special talent in the arena of 
foreign affairs, and he ultimately gained the president’s 
confidence to such a degree that Wilson was willing to send 
House overseas to negotiate with foreign dignitaries on his 
behalf. The most famous outcome of House’s foreign trips 
was the House-Grey Memorandum of 1916, inviting the 
belligerent nations to consider a peace conference and 
further promising a U.S. declaration of war against Germany 
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if the Central Powers rejected such an offer by the 
Allies.
28
   
Ultimately, House was instrumental to the primary 
subject of this study, guiding the mandates from concept to 
reality. Serving as the president’s principal colonial 
advisor, House became not only Wilson’s eyes and ears 
during negotiations over mandates in Paris, but also the 
key American member of the Mandates Commission that met in 
London in the summer of 1919. Though Wilson was certainly 
an active contributor to postwar colonial initiatives, he 
entrusted House with the responsibility of creating and 
articulating the American position regarding the postwar 
League of Nations mandates.  
 Formed in September 1917, the experts of The Inquiry 
were given the responsibility to prepare for the peace 
conference by identifying key topics of concern in a 
variety of fields and then supplying policy positions for 
Wilson, House, and others to consider prior to the start of 
negotiations. Although every specified division of The 
Inquiry fell under his purview, from those considering the 
geopolitics of Eastern and Western Europe to those 
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analyzing the Middle and Far East, House consistently 
gravitated toward the division assigned to formulate 
colonial policies and procedures. He conferred almost daily 
with the colonial experts, whereas he left the other 
divisions to their own devices for weeks at a time.  
Noted historian George Louis Beer served as House’s 
colonial expert, helping him form the American position on 
postwar decolonization in Africa and the Middle East. A 
scholar known for his expertise in the field of British 
colonialism, Beer was an easy choice for House in his 
effort to mold an extensive report on the social, 
political, and economic realities present within the 
African colonies.
29
 Among his most influential early ideas, 
Beer proposed to House the inclusion of provisions for 
indigenous rights and economic free trade, favoring 
trusteeship in the colonies rather than the traditional 
colonial oversight proposed by Great Britain and France. In 
a report for The Inquiry written in December 1917, Beer 
clarified this approach, first using the term “mandate” to 
describe The Inquiry’s colonial proposals: 
In case of any transfer of territory in Central  
Africa, and possibly even in the existing depend- 
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encies, it might, I think be definitely established, 
that the state exercising sovereignty in Africa is 
proceeding under an international mandate and must 
act as trustee primarily for the nations and  
secondarily for the outside world as a whole.
30
 
 
In subsequent statements regarding the German colonies in 
Africa, Beer further acknowledged that political expediency 
seemed likely to dominate any negotiations regarding the 
fate of colonial subjects. Though he realized his idea 
would generate much debate about colonial spoils of war 
among Britain and France, Beer nonetheless advocated 
altering the geopolitics in Africa by depriving Germany of 
its colonies. After all, Germany’s autocratic colonial 
policies prior to 1914 all but ensured the loss of its 
possessions at war’s end. Hence, in German East Africa, 
Beer advocated several initial resolutions, including one 
for less stringent colonial immigration laws allowing non-
Europeans greater access to the territories. He also 
criticized the prewar boundaries in West Africa. Here Beer 
recognized France’s political claim to the portion of 
Cameroon seized by Germany in 1911. Nonetheless, for the 
rest of Cameroon, he proposed trusteeship, whereby the 
former colonies would be overseen by a multinational body 
until they were ready for independence. Perhaps realizing 
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this idea might be unwelcome by the British and French, 
Beer included a reserve option, saying that if his proposal 
was deemed unfeasible, the only solution might be to 
”assign part of the Cameroons to British Nigeria and part 
to French Equatorial Africa.”31 
 In researching and writing these various reports for 
The Inquiry, Beer brought House up to speed on key 
precedents set by international law. Specifically, he 
viewed the Berlin Act of 1885 as a major turning point for 
colonialism in Africa. Ostensibly, the Berlin Conference 
(1884-1885) was held to regulate African trade and 
navigation rights, particularly on the Congo and Niger 
Rivers. In reality, the conferees merely rationalized 
territorial annexation by signing a collective agreement 
congruent with codes of international law. Article 34 of 
the Berlin Act reveals these motives, stating: 
Any power which henceforth takes possession of a tract 
of land on the coasts of the African Continent outside 
of its present possessions, or which, being hitherto 
without such possessions, shall acquire them and 
assume a protectorate.
32
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(New York: Macmillan, 1923), 57-67. 
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Article 35 vaguely elaborated on these imperial designs, 
suggesting that the conference delegates “ensure the 
establishment of authority in the regions occupied by them 
on the coasts of the African continent sufficient to 
protect existing rights.” As historian Niall Ferguson 
rightly asserts, these statements completely ignored the 
indigenous people and their legitimacy.
33
 
 George Louis Beer and Colonel House both recognized 
these legalities as positive trends. They appeared to 
believe that Wilson’s League of Nations could serve as a 
buttress against naked aggression and colonial subjugation, 
saying “it is not unjustifiable to wage such wars in Africa 
. . . but it is ignoble to use Africa merely as a pawn to 
purchase security elsewhere at the expense of the native.”34 
Yet, while his statements regarding the protection of 
indigenous peoples seemed altruistic, subsequent documents 
reveal that House and, to a lesser degree, Beer both shared 
Wilson’s notions for a more progressive strain of 
imperialism, especially those philosophies reminiscent of 
the British Empire’s administrative network in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.
35
 As noted Anglophiles, 
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Beer and House relished their membership in the British 
Round Table, which likely affected their colonial 
opinions.
36
 In truth, both largely favored accommodation 
with Britain and France concerning the colonies. Beer and 
House both sought to dismiss blatantly abusive colonial 
administration, favoring trusteeships over granting 
universal freedoms to indigenous people. Fearing the 
consequences of granting political, economic, and military 
freedom, even the idealistic Beer lamented that “arming the 
natives” with such freedoms would seriously “imperil the 
delicately balanced fabric” of allied relations.37      
 This is not to say that the idea of self-determination 
supplied by House (through Beer’s work) was deceitful. In 
fact, House truly sought national self-determination, 
albeit in a form agreeable to his own progressive 
“Wilsonian” worldview. Ultimately, the president and his 
colonial advisors were intent on modifying the traditional 
formula for outright colonialism, rationalizing their own  
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imperial philosophies by using idealistic rhetoric.
38
  
 Wilson’s early comments on the topic suggest that he 
was weighing colonial alternatives without committing to a 
particularly entrenched stance, a strategy reminiscent of 
Beer’s position. However, in keeping with his statements 
about the League’s moral value, Wilson sought to imbue the 
colonial settlement with humanitarian overtones that would 
prevent the looming Allied annexations from appearing 
blatantly aggressive. The president provided a glimpse of 
this veiled form of neo-imperialism in an oft-cited 
interview with Sir William Wiseman on October 16, 1918. In 
an effort to clarify his progressive vision, as contained 
in the Fourteen Points, Wilson condemned the atrocities of 
German colonialism and then decried previous international 
commissions as both inept and self-serving. He shamelessly 
declared his League of Nations to be the ideal nonpartisan 
entity for colonial administration. The president’s views 
are readily apparent in Wiseman’s interview notes, in which 
he writes of Wilson: 
He must warn the British, however, of the great 
jealousy of the other nations—including, he regretted  
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to say, a large number of people in America. It would, 
he thought, create much bad feeling internationally if  
the German colonies were handed over to us as a  
sovereign part of the British Empire. He wondered  
whether there was some way in which they could be  
administered in trust.  “In trust,” I asked, for  
whom?”  “Well, for the League of Nations,” he said.39 
 
Soon after, Wilson approved the rendition of the 
Fourteen Points that had been prepared by the secretary of 
The Inquiry, Walter Lippmann, and his colleague Frank Cobb, 
the editor of the New York World. Colonel House utilized 
this draft of the key ideas contained in the Fourteen 
Points throughout negotiations in Paris.
40
 Of particular 
interest to House were Lippmann’s and Cobb’s editorial 
comments on Point 5, which addressed German colonies and 
other colonial territories that could conceivably be 
objects of imperial desire when the war ended.
41
 Juggling 
the Franco-British concerns over ongoing colonial 
stability, Lippmann and Cobb suggested that “exploitation 
should be conducted on the principle of the open door.”42 
Despite the blatantly imperialistic overtones, this notion 
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influenced Wilson and House in later discussions with the 
Allies. 
Given their shared sentiments regarding Anglo-Saxon 
cultural superiority, it is no surprise that Wilson and 
House also revealed distinctly racist perspectives in their 
contact with minority leaders at home and abroad. A prime 
example is W.E.B. Du Bois, who favored creating a central 
African state composed of the former German colonies as 
well as the Belgian Congo. Du Bois believed this proposal 
aligned with the African desire for independence. It was 
endorsed by the NAACP Board of Directors in 1919 and then 
submitted to the Wilson administration.
43
 However, even 
though, on the surface, these notions were congruent with 
Wilson’s and House’s idealistic rhetoric on national self-
determination, not surprisingly, it proved too liberal or 
progressive to gain Wilson’s approval. 
Soon after his arrival in Europe for the peace 
conference, Wilson read The League of Nations: A Practical 
Suggestion, by General Jan Smuts of South Africa.
44
 Smuts 
has often been credited for the progressive mandates 
concept. In his proposal, Smuts outlined a colonial system 
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that could, conceivably function under Wilson’s League of 
Nations. Hence, at least in principle, trusteeship was to 
be favored over annexation. However, before Smuts’ 
reputation as a genuine progressive is written in stone, 
the following bears mentioning. Regardless of his stated 
idealism, Smuts was not genuinely committed to colonial 
independence. In truth, his imperial designs are not 
difficult to identify, because he was far more blatant in 
his rhetorical advocacy of continued spheres of colonial 
influence. In this vein, Smuts argued that because there 
were differing levels of colonial development, self-
determination could not be administered without thought for 
inherent geopolitical and cultural realities. Hence, 
according to Smuts, while certain peoples might be on the 
brink of readiness for self-government, others were less 
developed, and therefore “autonomy in any real sense would 
be out of the question.”45 
 At first it seemed Smuts might be willing to advocate 
shared oversight of mandated territories, meaning Wilson’s 
League would collectively determine whether former colonies 
had the right to national self-determination. However, 
Smuts rejected direct international administration as 
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impractical. Instead, he urged that the League utilize “the 
administrative organization of individual States for the 
purpose.” This could be accomplished “by nominating a 
particular State to act for and on behalf” of the League.46 
 Smuts’ proposals were significant, though perhaps not 
to the extent claimed by scholars over the years. George 
Curry characterized Wilson’s response to the Smuts plan by 
saying, “this document, more than any other of its kind, 
was to excite the imagination of the American President.”47  
In truth, though Wilson valued the articulate ideas in 
Smuts’ proposal, he certainly did not view the concepts as 
original. After all, under House’s oversight, The Inquiry 
had made similar proposals beginning in 1917. Wary of 
Smuts’ interest in annexing German Southwest Africa, Wilson 
nonetheless recognized the value inherent in the South 
African leader’s ideas. His proposals could serve as 
preliminary blueprints for Wilson, Beer, and House as they 
prepared for the upcoming Paris Peace Conference and 
juxtaposed their views on self-determination with those of 
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Smuts to create a controlled vision for a progressive 
future in colonial areas of the world.
48
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CHAPTER 4 
EDWARD HOUSE, WOODROW WILSON, AND COLONIAL NEGOTIATIONS AT 
THE PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE OF 1919   
 Woodrow Wilson and Edward House arrived in Paris 
hoping to secure their progressive international vision 
through intense, reasoned dialogue with their political 
counterparts, especially the delegates from Britain and 
France. Wilson and House were at least mildly apprehensive 
about their impending diplomatic responsibilities; yet they 
both entered the conference believing their principles 
would garner a favorable reception, with key elements of 
the Wilsonian progressive vision serving as something of a 
philosophical blueprint for the future of humanity. Such 
lofty expectations proved challenging given the vast array 
of geopolitical issues facing the delegates, from border 
reallocation and economic reparation to more tedious, petty 
rhetorical debates over assigning blame for the travesty of 
the war itself. 
Still, there was reason to hope, especially regarding 
the postwar colonial settlement, which Wilson and House 
were eager to define. When the conference began on January 
12, 1919, it became evident that colonial issues were 
prioritized by each of the key delegations. In fact, the 
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mandate system’s basic framework was in place by the end of 
the month, based partially on several important ideas 
articulated by Jan Smuts, but more notably on the concepts 
of trusteeship and League oversight established by House 
and The Inquiry beginning in 1917.   
INITIAL COLONIAL DECISIONS AT PARIS 
As indicated previously, the lion’s share of scholars 
have assumed that the Wilsonian vision was inherently 
idealistic, entailing the literal, universal pursuit of 
equality and independence for indigenous peoples under 
colonial rule.
1
 However, as this study has shown, the 
reality was that Wilson and House were both committed to 
their applied understanding of Anglo-Saxonism, Social 
Darwinism, and Christianity in Wilson’s case, as well as a 
dedication to the idea of American exceptionalism, all of 
which informed their philosophical approach to progressive 
politics. For their part, Wilson and House favored a 
colonial plan based largely upon the rhetorically laudable 
Wilsonian principle of national self-determination. But, 
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while their liberal internationalist vision may have been 
directed toward altering the old, traditional colonial 
structures, their ethnocentric and nationalist prejudices 
limited their ability to grasp the legitimate claims of 
non-white, non-European peoples living in colonial regions.
2
 
Even a non-white conference delegation like Japan was 
faced with a hard fight against the European and American 
delegates in Paris and London. Japan’s hopes of expanding 
its empire in the Pacific were viewed with suspicion by the 
Franco-British members. After shocking the world by 
defeating Russia in 1905, Japan had embarked upon a 
significant industrial expansion program during the Taishō 
period (1912-1926). At the very least, Japan sought 
inclusion in the open trade agreements overseen by the 
Europeans and Americans. Japan’s imperial ambitions were 
much larger, however. In truth, they hoped to challenge 
Europe’s colonial stranglehold in East Asia and assume that 
mantle of authority themselves.
3
  
A Japanese diplomat named Kijūrō Shidehara was crucial 
in paving the way for Japan’s imperial vision. Among other 
Pacific island holdings, he and Viscount Chinda both sought 
                                                          
2 See discussion on these elements in chapters 2 and 3 of this study. 
3 Frederick R. Dickinson, War and National Reinvention: Japan and the 
Great War, 1914-1919 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 
2001), 109-15. 
108 
the acquisition of China’s Shantung province as part of 
Japan’s expanding Pacific empire. This, of course, would 
prove extremely controversial given the fact that China had 
been promised the return of Shantung if Germany lost the 
war. Moreover, Japan’s desire for the inclusion of a racial 
equality amendment in the League covenant proved 
challenging, namely because British, French, and American 
delegates did not view the Japanese as equals. Hence this 
was a precarious issue during negotiations in Paris and 
London.
4
    
The British, French, and American delegates took the 
lead on the colonial settlement. Both Wilson and House 
anticipated that the League of Nations would ultimately be 
given administrative oversight of colonial territories in 
Africa, Asia, and the Middle East, thereby providing the 
United States and the European victors with the power to 
define independence as they saw fit and simultaneously 
oversee the gradual move toward independence for colonial 
peoples. The League’s oversight would not be cast in such 
an autocratic light, of course. After all, Wilson and House 
genuinely believed that a new colonial system could be 
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forged that would reflect the progressive Wilsonian vision 
for a new, enlightened order in the postwar world. In the 
eyes of Wilson and House, the blatantly abusive colonial 
order of the past had to be scrapped in favor of a new 
system that aligned with Wilsonian progressive standards, 
inspiring loyalty and trust in the process.
5
   
From the start, however, it became clear that the 
progressive notions held by Wilson and House were not 
entirely understood or embraced by the British and French 
delegates. While they were not completely at odds with one 
another, the British delegation, led by Prime Minister 
David Lloyd George, sought to fine-tune the existing 
colonial system. Rather than a system framed largely within 
Wilsonian progressive philosophy, Lloyd George and his 
British colleagues favored minor adjustments to the 
traditional form of colonialism that could be administered 
within the existing confines of the British Empire.
6
  
                                                          
5
 This was confirmed a few months later. See Wilson to House, June 27, 
1919, PWW, 61: 259-60; Council of Four Minutes, June 27, 1919, PWW, 61: 
275-77; and House Diary, June 27, 1919, House Papers, Yale. See also 
Cooper, Pivotal Decades, 3-30, 190-219; and Malcolm Magee, What the 
World Should Be: Woodrow Wilson and the Crafting of a Faith-Based 
Foreign Policy (Waco, TX: Baylor University Press, 2008), chapters 4-5. 
6 Council of Ten Minutes, January 24, 1919, PWW, 53: 337, 401-02; U.S. 
Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the 
United States, The Paris Peace Conference, 1919, 13 vols. (Washington 
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1942-1947), 3: 718. Hereafter cited 
as FRUS:PPC. 
110 
Lloyd George, Robert Cecil, and Arthur Balfour assumed 
it was necessary to provide a quid pro quo for British 
Dominions as partial payment for their loyal service to 
Britain from 1914 to 1918. Lloyd George, in particular, 
wanted to ensure that the Union of South Africa, Australia, 
and New Zealand received the former German territories they 
each desired: German Southwest Africa, New Guinea, and 
German Samoa, respectively.
7
 That Britain sought additional 
colonies was not surprising to House and Wilson. What truly 
concerned them was the fact that Lloyd George proposed to 
engage in open colonial annexation, in the process 
blatantly violating the rhetoric of Wilsonian progressive 
principles like national self-determination.
8
  
It is not that Wilson and House were naively expecting 
the victorious powers to grant immediate independence to 
all indigenous peoples under colonial rule. Neither man 
sought such a dramatic turn of events in the colonial 
world. However, both House and Wilson did believe the 
European colonial system was too often marred by corruption 
and brutality. Moreover, while certain colonial peoples 
seemed clearly “backward,” and incapable of self-rule, it 
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seemed possible that others deserved at least a chance for 
independence in the not-too-distant future. Of course, as 
American exceptionalists, House and Wilson arrived full of 
their own virtue, eager to convince their rival delegates 
of the merits of Wilsonian progressivism, which should be 
applied in the colonial world.
9
 The stage was set for much 
debate. 
This became clear during a meeting on January 24, 
1919, when the Council of Ten decided that none of the 
colonies would be returned to Germany. On the surface, this 
was reasonable to Wilson and House, both of whom believed 
that punishing Germany by seizing its colonies was a 
perfectly acceptable course of action. However, when Lloyd 
George and the British delegates further argued against 
broad international control over colonial administration, 
Wilson and House attempted to avert any early bad blood by 
introducing their ideas for the mandate system to the other 
delegates. To their great surprise, David Lloyd George 
embraced the idea of a mandate system from the start, and 
was (in theory) willing to accept the structure on behalf 
of Britain. In his opinion, it “did not differ materially 
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from the method in which the British Empire dealt with its 
colonies.”10 
Such a statement was obviously problematic. It 
highlighted the British belief that their administration of 
colonial peoples was broadly acceptable and enlightened, 
and thus that developing the mandate system would simply 
serve as a legal and rhetorical mechanism for ongoing 
British imperialism. Essentially, nothing would be overly 
affected by political and structural change in the 
colonies. To be sure, the French thought similarly, as will 
be revealed. Not surprisingly, then, Lloyd George called 
for outright annexation in the territories sought by the 
British Dominions of South Africa, Australia, and New 
Zealand, respectively. He then allowed the Dominions to 
present their claims for pursuing annexation, based 
primarily upon strategic considerations and geographical 
location.
11 
 For his part, Jan Smuts, the affable, yet enigmatic 
leader of the Union of South Africa, was concerned that 
America’s Wilsonian vision might endanger his colonial 
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designs in the former German colony of Southwest Africa, 
writing that Wilson was “entirely opposed to our annexing a 
little German colony here or there, which pains me 
deeply.”12 Smuts decided upon a rather shrewd strategy in an 
effort to turn the tide in his favor. In essence, he went 
out of his way to persuade the gathered delegates of the 
uniqueness of German Southwest Africa. “The Cameroons, 
Togo-land, and East Africa were all tropical and valuable 
possessions; South-West Africa was a desert country without 
any product of great value and only suitable for 
pastoralists.” Hence, he argued that his Union of South 
Africa was the logical choice for developing this former 
German colony, while simultaneously decrying the need for 
mandates. According to Smuts, the mandate system might 
deserve serious consideration in other African regions, but 
“there was not, in this instance, a strong case.”13 Hence 
British Dominions like the Union of South Africa forcefully 
pushed to annex the territories they respectively desired. 
Britain proper sought the mandate for East Africa. However, 
Lloyd George envisioned an extremely limited role for 
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Wilson’s League, preferring British colonial administration 
over any multinational body.
14
   
 Four days later, the French began pressing their 
colonial claims in Cameroon and Togo. Desiring even less 
international administrative oversight, the French 
delegation promoted a sweeping plan of annexation in 
western Africa. Addressing the Council of Ten on January 
28, 1919, French Colonial Minister Henri Simon pressed for 
colonial rewards as well. He specifically argued that 
France was “entitled to them for the same reasons that had 
been used by the British Dominions.” He further suggested 
that “the large sea coast of the Cameroons, and the port of 
Duala were required for the development of French 
Equatorial Africa.”15 Finally, after acknowledging the 
British Dominions’ concerns regarding international 
oversight, Simon provided a rather surreal philosophical 
defense of French colonial history, ending with an 
erroneous promise that France would secure and protect the 
indigenous rights in Togo and Cameroon and that free trade 
practices would be initiated in both colonies. In this, 
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Simon sought to appease the American delegation and forge 
ahead with the proposals for annexation.
16
 
Not surprisingly, President Wilson and Edward House 
responded by unequivocally rejecting British and French 
proposals they viewed as blatantly imperialistic and 
totally counter to the progressive ideals they espoused, 
ideals that many Americans and Europeans supposedly 
favored. Wilson, in particular, observed that “the 
discussion so far had been, in essence, a negation in 
detail–one case at a time–of the whole principle of 
mandatories.”17 In the hope that Wilson and House were not 
entirely opposed to ongoing colonial enterprises, British 
Foreign Secretary Arthur Balfour and Lloyd George attempted 
to appease Wilson and House while still achieving their 
aims. Lloyd George soothingly promised Britain’s 
cooperation in administering German East Africa under 
League provisions, and further stated that France seemed 
quite amenable to the mandates concept, despite Simon’s 
rhetoric to the contrary.
18
 Clemenceau also responded in a 
conciliatory manner. This was, however, unsurprising given 
his desire to subordinate colonial issues within French 
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foreign policy. According to historian Brian Digre, just as 
Simon’s presentation had represented the French colonial 
ministry’s annexationist ambitions, Clemenceau’s European 
focus allowed him to abandon them. Digre further observed 
that Lloyd George, though he agreed with certain elements 
of progressivism embraced by Wilson and House, had 
interpreted Simon’s speech better than Wilson.19  
 Clemenceau elaborated by expressing a willingness to 
make concessions as long as viable resolutions existed. In 
a clear effort to appease both of his allies, the French 
premier continued: 
He did not regret the discussions which had taken 
place on the subject, since these discussions had 
impressed him with the justness of the claims of the 
Dominions.  However, since Mr. Lloyd George was  
prepared to accept the mandate of the League of 
Nations he would not dissent from the general  
agreement, merely for the sake of the Cameroons and 
Togoland.
20
 
 
Ultimately, the meeting was adjourned without a resolution 
on the mandate concept. Yet, it was evident that during the 
meeting of January 28, an Anglo-French alliance was forged, 
accepting certain principles of the mandate system for the 
former German and Turkish territories.
21
 From Wilson’s and 
House’s perspective, however, much remained to be discussed 
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before the mandates came to fruition. Specifically, they 
desired to distance any new system from traditional 
colonialism, and they were particularly eager to avoid the 
perception of blatant expansion evident in the Anglo-French 
proposals.
22
  
In the following days, European and American leaders 
devised a carefully crafted compromise, which aimed at 
appeasing American concerns over the mandates being seen as 
the League’s disguise for annexation. President Wilson was 
not part of these negotiations, leaving House to forge a 
reasonable compromise with his British and French 
counterparts. Late on January 28 and early on the 29th, 
House met with Robert Cecil, Henri Simon, and several 
others. After much deliberation, they formed the basis of 
the three-tiered mandate system, later designated A, B, and 
C. In essence, the proposal for three classes of mandates 
favored categorizing the conquered territories on the basis 
of their geographic locations, simultaneously appointing 
League member governments as arbiters who would determine 
the political viability of indigenous leaders in Africa and 
the Middle East, and ultimately decide whether the 
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respective countries were ready to design and run their own 
governments.
23
 
The territories were to be assigned to one of three 
classes of mandates. A-mandate countries were deemed to be 
nearly ready for self-government, only requiring a minimal 
period of political oversight by the League of Nations 
before independence became a reality. B-mandate nations 
required more time. These countries would be assigned to a 
League member in trust, who would be responsible for 
overseeing the territory’s progressive development under 
League provisions, ensuring the prohibition of illegal 
trade in slaves, arms, and alcohol, while also curtailing 
militarization. C-mandate territories would technically 
function under the same provisions as the B-mandate 
countries, though they would be under even more extensive—
and long-term—control by the League.24    
Ostensibly, of course, the three-tiered plan allowed 
the mandated territories to gradually prepare for outright 
independence as they moved through the mandate categories. 
Eventually, the A mandates consisted of the former Arab 
provinces of the Ottoman Empire, whereas most of Germany’s 
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former African colonies formed the B mandates. However, the 
C mandates, consisting primarily of the countries sought by 
the British Dominions, were organized as a veiled form of 
annexation. Hence there would be ongoing debate over how to 
present the C mandates as benevolently as possible in order 
to implement the entire system.
25
  
Woodrow Wilson was grateful to House, Cecil, and the 
others, and was genuinely intrigued by the three-tiered 
concept, though he was slow in recognizing that much 
remained to be done, and that further compromise was likely 
to occur if the mandates were ever to become a reality.
26
 
Still, the president’s affirmation of the tiered mandate 
system is significant because it again confirms the true 
leanings of Wilson and House regarding the administrative 
fates of the colonies and their people. Few countries were 
likely to gain near-immediate independence as class A 
territories. Most would be identified as either B or C 
mandates, meaning that Wilson’s League would function, for 
the foreseeable future, much the same as mother countries 
had for centuries in the colonial world. The League would 
define and oversee much of the bureaucracy. It would 
                                                          
25 Alan Sharp, “The Mandate System in the Colonial World,” in William R. 
Keylor, ed., The Legacy of the Great War: Peacemaking, 1919 (New York: 
Houghton Mifflin Company, 1998), 171-74. 
26 Wilson to Lansing, January 30, 1919, PWW, 54: 262-63. 
120 
somehow measure whether indigenous peoples could modernize 
sufficiently, becoming self-sufficient through 
industrialization. Most importantly, the League would 
possess the authority to oversee cultural growth in the 
postwar colonial world, meaning elements of Wilsonian 
progressivism could be introduced and perhaps sustained in 
the far corners of the world. To be sure, Wilson and House 
both favored such possibilities.        
Even the C-mandates, for all their ideological 
challenges, did not horrify the president. In truth, it 
seems that Wilson was less concerned with the political 
practicality of the C mandates than he was with the 
perceptions that would result from their existence. In 
Wilson’s mind, it was one thing to allow the League of 
Nations to sanction a mandate that technically—and 
covertly—allowed for something akin to annexation. It was 
quite another to publicly frame the mandate with blatantly 
imperialistic rhetoric.
27
 As we know, neither Wilson nor 
House was eager for “undeserving” native peoples to receive 
outright independence, especially if they were not aligned 
with Wilsonian progressive standards. However, given the 
fact that the world was watching, it did not seem prudent 
                                                          
27 Council of Ten Minutes, January 29, 1919, FRUS:PPC, 3: 786. 
121 
for the victorious powers to flaunt imperialism, whether 
traditional or new. Clearly, there would have to be more 
discussion on the three-tiered structure, specifically the 
C mandates.   
The British delegation had created a committee on 
mandates composed of the prime ministers of the southern 
Dominions. By the afternoon of January 29, 1919, Lloyd 
George possessed a preliminary draft of the system that 
would prove to be remarkably close to the final version of 
the proposal.
28
 Smuts then verified Colonel House’s 
acceptance of the draft, assuming that Wilson also 
approved. It was subsequently approved by the British 
Empire delegation later that day.
29
 Then, on January 30, 
Lloyd George gladly offered the draft to the Council of 
Ten, though he acknowledged that it represented a rather 
tenuous compromise. For his part, Wilson considered the 
draft “very gratifying,” further remarking that it 
succeeded in making a “long stride towards the composition 
of their differences, bringing them to within an easy stage 
of final agreement.”30  
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However, shortly afterward, the negotiations again 
stalled due to a surprisingly intense disagreement between 
President Wilson and Australia’s Prime Minister, William 
Hughes, after the latter reiterated his nation’s desire for 
direct rather than League-administered oversight of C-
mandated territories. In response to Hughes’ diplomatic 
gaffe, Wilson argued that mandate decisions to that point 
be considered provisional only, infuriating Hughes and 
other delegates of the British Dominions, who felt they 
deserved to be instantly granted their desired territories 
after being so conciliatory earlier regarding the use of 
annexationist rhetoric. The fiery debate was extinguished 
only when Lloyd George advised provisional acceptance of 
the C mandates, to which the other delegates agreed.
31
 In 
1922, the provisional British draft was adopted nearly 
verbatim into Article Twenty-Two of the League Covenant. 
Paragraph seven of the British draft dealt specifically 
with Germany’s former colonies. It read as follows: 
They [the Allied and Associated Powers] further 
consider that other peoples, especially those of 
Central Africa, are at such a stage that the  
mandatory must be responsible for the administration 
of the territory subject to conditions which will 
guarantee the prohibition of abuses such as the slave 
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trade, the arms traffic and the liquor traffic, and  
the prevention of the military training of the natives 
for other than police purposes, and the establishment 
of fortifications or military and naval bases, and  
will also secure equal opportunities for the trade and 
commerce of other members of the League of Nations.
32
 
 
This proposed clause fostered much further debate 
regarding the conditions of the mandates for Cameroon and 
Togo. At a Council of Ten session on January 30, Canada’s 
Prime Minister, Robert Borden, suggested clarifying the 
language to ensure the prohibition against using C mandates 
for any military purpose, a change garnering quick support 
from Wilson and House.
33
 Predictably, however, the French 
sought to protect their right to conscript troops in their 
mandated territories. In this matter, Clemenceau was joined 
by Foreign Minister Stephen Pichon in advocating France’s 
needs for security in all French-controlled territories. 
Seeking to mediate a compromise, Lloyd George argued in 
favor of the clause, claiming that while it was a 
protective measure designed to prevent colonial powers from 
“raising great native armies against each other . . .  
there was nothing in this document which prevented France 
from doing what she did before” as a colonial power.34 
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 Clemenceau subsequently acquiesced, remarking that “if 
he could raise troops, that was all he wanted.” The debate 
continued for another hour or so, but was ultimately 
settled according to Lloyd George’s proposal.35 In truth, 
however, the language of paragraph seven was sufficiently 
imprecise so as to generate competing interpretations 
concerning French conscription of indigenous personnel.
36
 
Thus House would be forced to contend with this issue again 
while in London as a member of the Mandates Commission. 
Final Colonial Developments in Paris 
The Council of Ten’s formulas in late January 1919 for 
the mandate system provided a general theoretical framework 
for a comprehensive colonial settlement. These compromises 
were significant, however. In fact, the provisional draft 
of the League Covenant, presented by Woodrow Wilson to the 
third plenary session on February 14, included each of the 
major mandate system resolutions passed in January. These 
were subsequently written into the final Covenant during 
the fifth plenary session on April 28, 1919. Still, 
additional negotiations were required before a working 
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colonial settlement could be drafted and presented in full 
detail.
37
 
One crucial issue involved Japan’s colonial petitions, 
which remained unresolved at this stage. Like their British 
and French counterparts, Wilson and House feared an 
increased Japanese presence in the Pacific, primarily 
viewing Japan’s colonial ambitions through the lens of 
race. In this sense, it was bad enough to consider granting 
independence to newly formed indigenous governments, but 
even worse to acquiesce to an “inferior” racial power like 
Japan. Hence, throughout negotiations in Paris and London, 
the American delegates resisted compromising their stated 
commitments to Wilsonian progressivism by granting Japan 
its colonial desires too quickly, or without 
qualifications.  
Prior to the fifth plenary session held on April 28, 
matters came to a head. Wilson and House were hoping to 
dissuade Japan from seeking to acquire the Shantung 
province in China. Again, the Chinese expected Shantung’s 
return upon the defeat of Germany. In April 1919, Wilson 
and House still sided with China, recognizing their 
position as inherently sensible given the geographic and 
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cultural realities. In an effort to persuade the Japanese 
to relinquish their claim on Shantung, Wilson suggested 
that Japan would not require (or benefit from) any special 
interests in Shantung because of the League’s impending 
recognition of the “open door” principle.38 Viscount Chinda 
and the Japanese delegates remained unmoved, demanding that 
Germany’s claims to the Shantung province be transferred to 
Japan. Finally, when Chinda threatened to prohibit Japan 
from signing the peace treaty unless they acquired 
Shantung, Wilson at last relented. In the end, Wilson and 
House apparently decided it was less dangerous to alienate 
the Chinese in order to secure Japan’s future membership in 
the League.
39
 Whether or not that decision was sound 
remained to be seen. 
Beginning on April 30, 1919, the delegates of the 
great powers who advanced the mandate system toward a 
finalized structure were known simply as the Council of 
Four, composed of Wilson, Lloyd George, Clemenceau, and 
Italy’s Vittorio Orlando. Having quarreled with the others 
over the Adriatic settlement, Orlando had temporarily 
returned to Italy, reducing the number to three. Even with 
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Orlando absent, Wilson, Lloyd George, and Clemenceau, as an 
informal “council of three,” found plenty to argue about. 
Their respective subordinates—Edward House, Lord Robert 
Cecil, and Henri Simon—were also present and active in 
these ongoing discussions over mandates in Paris.
40
  
Predictably, several unresolved disputes that had lain 
dormant since January reappeared during the Council of Four 
discussions during the first week of May.
41
 The foremost of 
these involved Belgium’s claim to part of the former German 
East Africa. On April 24, 1919, the Commission on German 
Colonies had composed the following statement: “Germany 
renounces, in favor of the Five Allied and Associated 
Powers, all its rights and titles to its overseas 
possessions.”42 In addition to the United States, Britain, 
France, and Italy, the fifth of these powers was Japan, 
whose colonial ambitions rivaled those of France. Not 
surprisingly, Belgium reacted negatively to this 
proclamation, assuming its claims in East Africa were in 
danger of being nullified. In response, Belgium’s premier, 
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Paul Hymans, asked Clemenceau to speak on Belgium’s behalf, 
which he did at a council meeting on May 2, 1919.
43
 
 The British and American delegates did not initially 
favor Belgium in this matter. In fact, Lloyd George 
adamantly opposed altering the language of the clause to 
include a “sixth power,” believing the Belgian claim was 
“most impudent,” further remarking that millions of British 
soldiers had fought for the cause of Belgium during the 
war, whereas “only a few black troops had been sent into 
German East Africa.” Moreover, Wilson and Lloyd George both 
implied that affirming the Belgian claim in detail was 
perhaps a premature exercise given the fact that the clause 
was not intended as a formal draft of specific mandate 
provisions. Clemenceau agreed, and relayed the council’s 
decision to the Belgian delegates, pledging that the League 
of Nations, once officially formed, would be responsible 
for hearing final proposals on the matter of German East 
Africa.
44
  
Lloyd George was eager to complete the colonial 
settlement in Paris, remarking on May 5 that he was “most 
anxious to be able to announce the mandates to the Press at 
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the time when the Peace Treaty was issued.” However, Wilson 
still had certain reservations and responded apprehensively 
to Lloyd George’s proposal for a prompt settlement. Wilson 
was particularly concerned, saying he hoped to prevent “the 
appearance of a division of the spoils being simultaneous 
with the Peace.”45 Further consideration of the former 
German colonies was scheduled for the following afternoon.  
Perhaps inevitably, given the delegates’ levels of 
physical exhaustion, some final clashes occurred at the 
sessions on May 6 and May 7. At this late stage, resolving 
the future status of Cameroon and Togo was one topic that 
proved difficult, generating debate. Filling in for an 
absent Lord Milner, the French Colonial Minister, Henri 
Simon, provided an overview of Anglo-French negotiations on 
Togo and Cameroon to that point. The future of Cameroon 
appeared settled, at least in principle. Hence the 
delegates quickly agreed to assign Cameroon as a French 
mandate, though a provision was added requiring France to 
clarify and resolve the ongoing border dispute with 
Nigeria.
46
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Deciding Togo’s fate, however, required more elaborate 
discussion. In this case, both Lloyd George and Clemenceau 
opposed a formal mandate structure, with Britain’s prime 
minister declaring that “the country was cut into small 
bits, and it might be found that half of a tribe was under 
a mandate, and the other was not.” Wilson challenged the 
Anglo-French opposition, not because of the logic, but 
rather because he was opposed to blatant imperialism 
outside the framework of mandates. After assurances that 
Henri Simon would draft a proposal to resolve the issue, 
Wilson agreed to this provisional resolution on Togo.
47
  
On the morning of May 7, two final disputes had to be 
resolved before the delegates could issue the colonial 
proposals. First, the French delegation went back on the 
previous day’s agreement regarding Cameroon. Clemenceau and 
Simon again stipulated French sovereign rights to the part 
of the Cameroon territory that Germany had acquired from 
France in 1911, given that the British would directly annex 
a slice of German Cameroon to Nigeria without a mandate.  
In essence, Simon demanded a quid pro quo given that 
France’s acquired territory in Cameroon was to be assigned 
as a mandate under League supervision. Lloyd George and 
                                                          
47 Ibid. 
131 
Balfour briefly attempted to rationalize their previous 
position. Second, the British and French delegations had 
not yet agreed to the division of German Togoland between 
them. Avoiding further delay while seeking an agreement in 
Paris, Lloyd George proposed to postpone a final settlement 
for Cameroon and Togo until later when the French and 
British would make a joint recommendation to the League of 
Nations regarding the future of these former German 
colonies. Wilson did not object to this compromise, which 
would give the League a supervisory role in this eventual 
colonial settlement.
48
  
One final debate emerged over whether Italy deserved 
territorial compensation given the nature of British and 
French imperial gains in Africa. The Italians feared an 
exclusionary colonial agreement, denying them a place at 
the mandate system table. Citing the Treaty of London 
(1913), they reminded their British and French counterparts 
that Italy was promised “colonial compensation” if the 
German Empire faltered and Anglo-French imperial expansion 
occurred in Africa. Subsequently, in an effort to appease 
the Italian delegation, both Lloyd George and Clemenceau 
readily conceded these Italian claims and further promised 
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to bring them before the League of Nations at a future 
point to be determined.
49
   
Late on May 7, 1919, the initial mandate system 
proposal was submitted in Paris. It proved remarkably 
similar to the notions supplied by Edward House and George 
Louis Beer more than a year earlier as part of The 
Inquiry.
50
 House and Beer had designed provisions for 
indigenous rights and economic free trade, favoring 
trusteeship in the colonies rather than the colonial 
oversight proposed by Great Britain and France. Both 
recognized the new colonial structure as positive. After 
all, through the mandate system Wilson’s League of Nations 
could pursue ostensibly enlightened progress for colonial 
peoples, promising them freedom and independence in the 
future, while ensuring that Western, specifically American, 
cultural values reigned. While House and Wilson sought 
national self-determination, they did so in ways that were 
agreeable to European colonial interests within the 
rhetorical framework of their own ideas of Wilsonian 
progressivism. Ultimately, the president and his colonial 
emissary, House, were intent on modifying the traditional 
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formula for outright colonialism, rationalizing their own 
philosophies in the process.
51
  
Yet, seizing upon Woodrow Wilson’s stated commitments 
to equality and national self-determination, many scholars 
have assumed that Wilson and the American delegation were 
forced to abandon their high ideals in favor of appeasing 
the Allies.
52
 However, despite the various concessions made 
at the Paris Peace Conference, the creation of the mandate 
system should be viewed as a significant achievement for 
the American delegates. While Wilson and House adamantly 
objected to blatant colonial expansion through annexation, 
they did so because the former trappings of colonialism did 
not fit into their own progressive, yet still controlled, 
notions of trusteeship. Throughout the Paris Peace 
conference, Wilson and House repeatedly met to discuss the 
ongoing colonial negotiations. At times, both men were 
frustrated by certain ideas put forth by the British and 
French delegations in particular, such as the French 
argument for using colonial troops to secure French 
strategic interests. However, as the negotiations in Paris 
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were winding down, Wilson and House conveyed a sense of 
satisfaction with the colonial formula, viewing it as an 
outright success rather than a capitulation to French and 
British imperial interests.
53
 Despite occasional 
confrontations between the delegates, true Wilsonian 
principles remained intact. Writing in his diary on May 8, 
House noted that the vast majority of the colonial 
settlement had “been fostered . . . in accordance with the 
highest of ideals.”54 Crucially, the fact that Wilson’s 
League would be granted supervisory control over the 
mandate system suggested that Wilsonian progressivism could 
be instilled regardless of French or British imperial 
designs.  
After all, Wilson endorsed the resolution requiring 
the United States to serve as the League’s mandatory power 
in Armenia. The U.S. Senate failed to pass the eventual 
treaty, declining American membership in the League of 
Nations; hence the United States never actually accepted 
the Armenian mandate. However, the American delegation’s 
mere compliance with the original resolution is perhaps the 
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most obvious indicator of the veiled form of imperialism 
present in the minds of Wilson and House. Rhetoric aside, 
they failed to account for the inherent geopolitical 
realities of a pluralist world, instead sanctioning a 
mandate system that continued to favor white, European 
influence over indigenous peoples. Accordingly, the League 
would decide upon the future form of administration to be 
adopted in many of the colonial areas. As indicated in the 
previous chapter, Wilson’s League would determine whether 
former colonies had the right to self-determination. 
 When measured alongside paternalistic notions of 
bringing “civilization” to the “savage” races, the true 
Wilsonian intentions seem more apparent. The primary 
concern rested not on ensuring colonial peoples’ full-
fledged freedom from foreign governments, but on finding a 
new, acceptable way of bestowing American progressive 
standards on colonial peoples. While perhaps different from 
traditional forms of European colonialism, these ideas 
simply represented a new brand of imperialism, wrapped in 
the League of Nations and multi-national control. The 
colonial discussions initiated in Paris continued 
throughout the summer of 1919. After Wilson and many of the 
other delegates left Paris and returned home, House 
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prepared for an even more intensive term of service in 
London as the chief American representative assigned to the 
Mandates Commission.  
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CHAPTER 5  
EDWARD M. HOUSE AND THE COMMISSION ON COLONIAL MANDATES: 
JULY – AUGUST 1919 
 Perhaps because of a greater historical profile, 
colonial negotiations during the Paris Peace Conference 
itself have received far greater attention from historians 
than they have devoted to the subsequent implementation of 
the new system of mandates. Yet, the Commission on Colonial 
Mandates that met in London throughout the summer of 1919 
was, at the very least, equally responsible for the 
colonial settlement eventually adopted as Article Twenty-
Two of the League of Nations Covenant in 1922. In fact, 
though a rudimentary framework for the mandate system was 
in place when the Treaty of Versailles was signed on June 
28, 1919, much work remained before the mandates could 
actually be designated and assigned.   
FORMATION OF THE COMMISSION ON COLONIAL MANDATES 
 Formed by the Council of Four on June 27, 1919, the 
Commission on Colonial Mandates was given the significant, 
but unenviable, charge of finalizing the structure of the 
colonial settlement. Specifically, the commission was 
designed to accomplish four major tasks: to analyze Belgian 
and Portuguese demands in German East Africa, to conversely 
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hear the appeals of the indigenous Aborigines Societies 
regarding German East Africa, to draft a report detailing 
these divergent interests, and finally to draft the model 
A, B, and C mandates for eventual consideration by the 
governing members of the League of Nations once its charter 
was formally established.
1
 The five commissioners selected 
to head the negotiations were Edward House for the United 
States, Lord Alfred Milner for the British Empire, Henri 
Simon for France, Senator Guglielmo Marconi for Italy, and 
Viscount Chinda Sutemi for Japan. Britain’s Lord Robert 
Cecil and George Louis Beer from the United States also 
served in advisory roles.
2
 Notably absent from the 
commission were the four leading statesmen at Paris—Wilson, 
Lloyd George, Clemenceau, and Orlando—each of whom appeared 
comfortable delegating the responsibilities for further 
colonial decisions to these aforementioned advisors. 
 President Woodrow Wilson returned to the United States 
immediately after signing the Versailles Treaty, weary from 
the grueling months of peacemaking in Paris.  Already in a 
weakened state, he had other matters on his mind as he 
journeyed home. He was preparing for what proved to be the 
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most heated political confrontation of his presidency, a 
debilitating battle with the U.S. Senate over ratification 
of the peace treaty and his prized League of Nations.
3
 
Hence, though the president continued to receive detailed 
reports from Edward House on the progress of the Mandate 
Commission in London, his focus was elsewhere during the 
summer and fall of 1919. 
 Wilson’s absence from the commission is noteworthy 
because it signifies a meaningful transition in the 
diplomatic command structure after the completion of the 
German peace treaty at the Paris Peace Conference. The 
president, who functioned as the chief U.S. delegate during 
the conference, withdrew from further colonial negotiations 
at a crucial stage.  Beginning on June 28, 1919, intent on 
other tasks, Wilson assumed a greatly reduced role in 
finalizing the basic structure of the mandate system. 
Amazingly, this transitional change in colonial decision-
making has been virtually ignored by historians, most of 
whom were more interested in analyzing either the European  
colonial demands in Paris or the finalized settlement  
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accepted by the League of Nations in 1922.
4
   
 In considering the significance of Wilson’s minimal 
role alongside the primary role of Edward House, two key 
questions arise. The first involves Wilson’s decision to 
delegate primary responsibility for the colonial settlement 
to anyone else at this time.  After all, it seems clear 
that the president was deeply interested in devising a new 
colonial system characterized by his own progressive vision 
for national self-determination. Why, then, did Wilson 
allow anyone else to dictate Wilsonian principles on 
colonialism to the Allies during the mandate system’s final 
stages of development? The second issue centers on the fact 
that, of all people, House was the individual authorized by 
Wilson to be the principal U.S. commissioner for the 
remaining colonial discussions at a time when their once 
close partnership had supposedly reached a tumultuous and 
sudden end. Perhaps the best way to address the first issue 
of the president’s withdrawal from colonial negotiations is 
to make sense of the second, to place the allegedly 
                                                          
4 Among the many studies that either downplay or ignore the role of the 
Mandates Commission, the following are some of the most noteworthy: 
Alan Sharp, The Versailles Settlement: Peacemaking in Paris, 1919 (New 
York: St. Martin’s Press, 1991), 159-84; MacMillan, Paris: 1919, 98-
106. Godfrey Hodgson, Woodrow Wilson’s Right Hand, 215-56, neglects to 
mention much of anything regarding the Mandates Commission, mistakenly 
stating that House spent the months of July and August “vacationing.”   
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compromised relationship between Wilson and his longtime 
friend and adviser in proper context.  
THE INFAMOUS BREAK BETWEEN WILSON AND HOUSE  
 Over the years, scholars have repeatedly attempted to 
explain why the intimate bond of friendship that existed 
between Wilson and House did not survive the Paris Peace 
Conference. Most have concluded that the rift occurred over 
a period of months, beginning sometime in March of 1919, 
amidst the highly stressful atmosphere of the peace 
negotiations, and becoming progressively more apparent by 
the treaty signing in June.
5
 However, while there can be 
little doubt that a “break” of sorts occurred in Paris, 
claims that the rift was so extreme as to permanently 
destroy their mutual respect and admiration for one another 
most likely exaggerate the actual nature of the parting.   
In fact, the reasons behind the so-called “break” 
remain unclear, though historical speculation has centered 
upon a few common themes. Believing that Wilson had 
developed serious reservations about House’s personal and 
political loyalties by the signing of the treaty, a number 
                                                          
5 The literature on the break between Wilson and House is extensive, but 
the following works are instructive: George and George, Woodrow Wilson 
and Colonel House, 240-67; Cooper, Breaking the Heart of the World, 89-
90; Edwin A. Weinstein, “Woodrow Wilson’s Neuropsychological Impairment 
at the Paris Peace Conference,” in PWW, 58: 635-38; Hodgson, Woodrow 
Wilson’s Right Hand, 215-34.   
142 
of historians have argued that Wilson was the one who took 
action. These analyses specifically allege that the 
president became increasingly frustrated by Colonel House’s 
habitual predilection for conducting what might be termed 
as “extracurricular” diplomacy, meeting alone with foreign 
officials or dignitaries and engaging in supposedly 
unsanctioned negotiations. Though questions surrounding 
Wilson’s health and state of mind are often factored in to 
the equation, ultimately these interpretations forcefully 
argue that Wilson’s distrust and frustration with House, 
irrational or not, grew until reaching a zenith, at which 
point the president had no choice but to sever ties with 
House in order to safeguard American policy from his 
careless, albeit well-intentioned, diplomacy.
6
 
 Admittedly, there is some truth to the fact that House 
tended toward pretentious behavior, viewing himself as a 
superior diplomat, far more suited to personally negotiate 
foreign policy than others in the administration, including 
Wilson himself. However, there is a paucity of evidence 
indicating that House willfully exceeded his diplomatic 
authority, either in formal negotiations or in more casual 
conversational settings. To be sure, Wilson and House 
                                                          
6 George and George, 240-67; Cooper, 89-90; Hodgson, 215-34.  
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differed in their negotiating philosophies. Whereas Wilson 
was often unwilling to compromise, even on the minutiae of 
treaty phraseology, House tended toward a more conciliatory 
approach to diplomatic discussions. Still, based on the 
evidence available, it seems House’s policy objectives 
remained in line with those of Wilson. The colonel simply 
realized, perhaps better than the president, that measured 
compromise was necessary, even preferable, in order to 
secure broader policy goals. Furthermore, while House and 
Wilson occasionally disagreed in private about the proper 
formulation and application of foreign policy, the evidence 
overwhelmingly suggests that House ultimately abided the 
president’s decisions, regardless of any personal 
misgivings he may have had.
7
 This is not surprising, given 
their shared progressive visions.  
Thus, charges that House was somehow undercutting 
presidential authority and pursuing his own diplomatic 
agenda in Paris or London are most assuredly false. In 
                                                          
7 These observations are based largely upon ongoing dialogues between 
House and Wilson in 1919, before and after the supposed break, all of 
which remained quite cordial in nature. Not only do their respective 
letters and telegrams suggest mutual support, the records found in the 
Council of Four Minutes in Paris and the Minutes from the Meetings of 
the Commission on Mandates in London bear out the notion that House 
respected Wilson’s wishes and closely abided by their agreed-upon 
principles once Wilson was in the United States.  Notes of the 
Commission on Mandates, July–August, 1919, File No. 181.227, General 
Records of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace.  
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truth, the arguments for Wilson’s vehement disillusionment 
with House (or visa versa) appear to be anecdotal, based 
largely upon the rumors and innuendos created first by 
contemporaries of the two men, and subsequently seized upon 
by scholars convinced that such a close friendship could be 
undone solely by personal disloyalty or some unforgivable 
act of political disloyalty undertaken by House or profound 
misunderstanding by Wilson.
8
 
 A more likely theory regarding the so-called “break” 
involves Wilson’s second wife, Edith Bolling Galt Wilson, 
whom the president married in December 1915. If any one 
person could conceivably be charged with subverting the 
intimate ties between President Wilson and Colonel House, 
it would be Edith Wilson, especially because of her fervent 
desire to be her husband’s closest friend, companion, and 
adviser. In fact, there is ample evidence to suggest that 
the second Mrs. Wilson felt extremely threatened by anyone 
whose relationship with the president rivaled her own, in 
as much as that was possible. Moreover, she never hid the 
fact that she was specifically bothered by Wilson’s 
relationship with House, often questioning the president 
                                                          
8 See Hodgson, 215-34, and the biased, accusatory comments of Woodrow 
Wilson’s physician, Dr. Cary Grayson, in “The Colonel’s Folly and the 
President’s Distress,” American Heritage, 1964. 
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about House’s true loyalties and commenting on the 
colonel’s seemingly endless list of shortcomings, all the 
while contrasting these with the prized character traits 
she so admired in her husband.
9
 Wilson surely appreciated 
the high praise of his wife, and undoubtedly began to 
increasingly heed her counsel over time. Whether or not 
Edith Wilson truly loathed House, and further counseled 
Wilson to discard their friendship, remains unclear. 
However, she most certainly did not have a high opinion of 
the colonel, or Mrs. House for that matter, and her 
jealousy may very well have been a key factor in driving a 
wedge between the two men.   
 In any case, over time, Edith Wilson asserted herself 
as much more than just the president’s loving spouse.  
Perhaps inevitably, she assumed many expanded roles, acting 
behind the scenes as the president’s trusted counselor, 
dispensing advice and providing emotional support whenever 
possible, especially after Wilson’s health declined visibly 
during the peace negotiations, a factor which has also been 
used to explain the dissolved friendship. This argument 
centers on the increasingly frequent displays of anger, 
                                                          
9 George and George, 156; Edith Wilson, My Memoir (New York: Bobbs-
Merrill, 1939), especially chapters 6 and 7. 
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aggression, and paranoia displayed by President Wilson 
immediately before, during, and after the peace conference. 
Innumerable stresses affected Wilson’s ability to think and 
act rationally on occasion. In fact, as recent scholarship 
has shown, these anomalies were most likely physical signs 
that Wilson’s health was so severely compromised that he 
may very well have been experiencing a series of smaller 
strokes in early to mid-1919, prior to the near-fatal 
stroke he suffered in October of that year. Hence, it is 
possible that the president was more vulnerable than he 
typically would have been to suggestions of House’s 
disloyalty made by Edith Wilson, the president’s physician, 
Dr. Cary Grayson, and Secretary of State Robert Lansing, 
among others.
10
 
 Ultimately, there can be little doubt that a once-warm 
friendship and political partnership between Colonel House 
and Woodrow Wilson was permanently compromised, though I 
believe it dissolved not from a profound change in mutual 
trust or personal malice, but primarily as a resulting 
combination of personal and political expediency. After 
all, even the closest bonds of friendship evolve. A more 
                                                          
10 See especially Weinstein, PWW, 58: 635-38. See also Grayson, “The 
Colonel’s Folly,” Cooper, 89-90, and Hodgson, 230-34. 
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realistic appraisal suggests their enormously beneficial 
partnership had simply run its course. The two men, whose 
resolutely independent temperaments were remarkably 
similar, had simply outgrown one another by mid-1919.   
While theories of Edith Wilson’s jealous intrigues and 
her husband’s questionably irrational state of mind offer 
partial explanations, they do not account for a rather 
stark reality. Despite any personal differences that 
existed by June of 1919, House retained the president’s 
confidence as his most trusted colonial emissary. Wilson 
knew and trusted House’s personal and political integrity. 
To suggest otherwise would be counter-intuitive. If, 
indeed, he had serious reservations about House, Wilson 
surely would not have allowed him to head the American 
delegation in London that finalized the crucial mandates 
issues, especially given the plethora of qualified 
ambassadors and scholars at the president’s disposal, 
including Beer and David Hunter Miller, among others. The 
fact of the matter is that House remained the ideal choice 
for Wilson, especially given the colonel’s considerable 
background in forming colonial policy, specifically U.S. 
notions of the mandate system. 
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 And so, as he had done prior to the peace conference, 
Wilson delegated primary responsibility for American 
colonial policy to House. On June 29, 1919, the morning 
following the treaty signing, Wilson embarked on the ship 
heading back to the United States. Sadly, this farewell, in 
which House encouraged the president to “meet the Senate in 
a more conciliatory spirit,” proved to be the last meeting 
between the long-time friends. Though they continued to 
exchange correspondence, both official and personal, they 
never actually saw one another again. Wilson’s response to 
House’s plea revealed the president’s uncompromising state 
of mind by that time. Whereas House was still prepared to 
engage in measured compromise to achieve larger, vital 
policy objectives, Wilson had apparently become 
increasingly rigid, declaring: “House, I have found one can 
never get anything in this life that is worth while without 
fighting for it.”  In a rather melodramatic rejoinder, 
House, forever the Anglophile, tellingly reminded Wilson 
that the bedrock of “Anglo-Saxon civilization was built up 
on compromise.”11  
 
                                                          
11 Final parting between Wilson and House, June 29, 1919, PWW 61: 354-
55. 
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PREPARING FOR THE COMMISSION ON COLONIAL MANDATES IN LONDON 
 Wilson’s confidence in his old friend, Edward House, 
seemed well placed. For his part, House had been 
instrumental in advocating further, detailed analysis into 
the form and function of mandates. In a letter to Wilson on 
June 23, 1919, House adamantly expressed his concern about 
the mandates, remarking: “I feel with Lord Robert [Cecil] 
that perhaps one of the chief duties of the Peace 
Conference will be left undone unless some authoritative 
statement is made at once concerning the mandatory 
system.”12 House further detailed to Wilson his support for 
Lord Cecil’s proposed commission, believing it to be a 
vital initiative for improving the fundamentally vague 
mandates concept in place at that time. Logically, he 
argued, after actually drafting the three classes of 
mandates, the commission would then open their colonial 
resolutions to public debate, whereby “criticism will be 
invited just as it was invited with regard to the Covenant 
of the League.”13 Yet, for all of his interest and concern, 
House was somewhat forlorn about being assigned as a member 
of the Commission on Colonial Mandates, viewing the 
                                                          
12 House Diary, June 23, 1919, House Papers, Yale. 
13 Ibid. 
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appointment as yet another unsought responsibility that 
forced him to remain overseas. Confiding to his diary on 
June 21, 1919, House revealed a desire to return home to 
the United States, saying, “I am eagerly anticipating a 
triumphant return home in the wake of this exhausting work 
in Paris.”14  
In the end, however, House agreed to serve as the head 
of the American delegation to London, once again appointing 
George Louis Beer as his chief advisor in this enterprise. 
In light of the heated discussions on colonialism during 
the peace conference, House realized that Beer’s expertise 
would be vital in providing greater legitimacy to any and 
all American perspectives offered in further colonial 
negotiations. To be sure, Beer’s background as a colonial 
historian had proven valuable during the peace conference, 
and House understood he would need further assistance. In 
many respects, Beer was again an ideal source of 
information, providing House with a ready interpretation of 
colonial positions taken by their counterparts from 
Britain, France, Italy, and Japan. However, House was the 
final arbiter in London regarding American colonial policy.  
                                                          
14 House Diary, June 21, 1919, House Papers, Yale. 
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 House seems to have relished his renewed autonomy. He 
certainly had benefited from the president’s confidence as 
head of The Inquiry in 1917 and 1918, prior to the Paris 
Peace Conference. At that time, he was given primary 
authority to form and mold colonial policy with little 
interference from anyone, even Wilson. Now, as the lead 
U.S. delegate in London, House once again became 
responsible for defining and molding the American colonial 
initiatives according to the progressive political and 
cultural standards that he and Wilson embraced.
15
   
In truth, as the head of The Inquiry as well as the 
chief U.S. delegate on the commission responsible for 
finalizing and assigning the mandates, House likely 
deserves more credit than President Wilson for creating the 
colonial system eventually adopted by the League of Nations 
in 1922. However, with greater authority comes greater 
responsibility. As shall be made evident through his 
service in London in July and August of 1919, House’s 
application of “Wilsonian” national self-determination to 
the former German and Turkish colonies deserves much 
scrutiny, especially because of the imperial philosophies, 
both subtle and overt, contained in the colonial settlement 
                                                          
15 House Diary, June 30, 1919, House Papers, Yale. 
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reached by House, Beer, and the other members of the 
mandates commission.  
NEGOTIATIONS AND RESOLUTIONS OF THE MANDATES COMMISSION 
 Technically, the first formal meeting of the 
Commission on Colonial Mandates was held in Paris, on the 
morning of June 28th, the day of the treaty signing. 
Presided over by Britain’s Lord Milner, this initial 
gathering appears to have been held primarily to formulate 
a tentative meeting schedule in London. In fact, like 
several other members, House opted not to attend, sending 
Beer in his stead.  The next Mandates Commission meeting 
was scheduled ten days later in London.
16
  
The only topic of discussion generating debate at this 
preliminary meeting involved the specific nature and 
application of B and C mandates in relation to the Pacific 
Islands and Southwest Africa, namely whether or not these 
two territories could both be designated as part of the 
same class. Viscount Chinda from Japan was rather adamant 
about branding the islands north of the Equator as B-class 
mandates only if those south of the Equator—namely the 
territories in Africa and the South Pacific sought by 
                                                          
16 From David Hunter Miller’s notes on the first meeting of the Mandates 
Commision (in Paris) on June 28, 1919, PWW, 61: 332-34. 
153 
Britain, France, and the Dominions—were given the same 
designation. 
17
 This is no surprise given Japan’s desire to 
achieve strategic equality, even dominance in the Pacific. 
While no consensus was reached on this specific issue, the 
collective desire of Britain, France, the Dominions, and 
Japan to seek C-class mandates did not sit well with Beer, 
and he said as much to both Cecil and House later that 
evening.
18
 Again, Beer, House, and Cecil surely opposed the 
Japanese proposal not only because of any misgivings they 
had about achieving a status quo on the B and C mandates, 
but also because of their inherently racist perspectives 
regarding Japan’s capacity to serve as a mandate power.  
From the beginning, Beer viewed the three-tiered 
mandate structure as problematic because it seemed to open 
the door to rampant manipulation by the mandatory powers. 
The C mandates were especially troubling because they were 
structured to allow for complete territorial oversight on 
the part of the mandatory power, meaning that, for all 
intents and purposes, traditional colonial administration 
would continue in the C-class countries. Not only was Beer 
                                                          
17 Notes of the First Meeting of the Commission on Mandates, June 28, 
1919, File No. 181.227, General Records of the American Commission to 
Negotiate Peace.  
18 George Louis Beer Diary, June 28, 1919, Manuscripts and Archives, 
Library of Congress, 128. 
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upset by such blatant attempts to prolong colonialism, he 
was also anxious over the thought that European countries 
assigned to oversee the progression of B-class mandates 
might seek to downgrade their given territory to C-class in 
order to be granted administrative carte blanche.
19
        
 Essentially, Beer anticipated the blatantly imperial 
designs of the delegates assigned to London. In his brief 
conversation with House and Cecil on the evening of June 
28, he specifically warned them of the impending clash over 
territorial definitions, claiming Wilson’s ideal of 
national self-determination was in jeopardy unless the 
other commission members could be swayed.
20
 Yet, in voicing 
his initial concerns about the upcoming negotiations, Beer 
also displayed a distinct lack of comprehension regarding 
the progressive ambitions for the colonial world that 
Wilson and House possessed. These differences would surface 
repeatedly during the weeks of negotiation and compromise 
in London, forcing Beer to re-evaluate the true nature of 
Wilsonian progressivism.  
For his part, House attempted to assuage Beer’s stated 
concerns by promising to uphold and endorse the Wilsonian 
                                                          
19 Beer Diary, July 7-13, 1919, Library of Congress, 131.  
20 Ibid. 
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commitment to liberal internationalism in the form of self-
determination in colonial territories.
21
 Not surprisingly, 
Beer was initially quite pleased to hear such affirmation 
coming from House, though Beer gradually realized that 
House’s notions of progressive philosophy as applied to 
colonial territories differed from his own far more than he 
anticipated.
22
 However, House, as he prepared for the time 
in London at the end of June, was confident that the final 
colonial structure formed by the Mandates Commission would 
measure up to the progressive standards that he and Wilson 
sought. Confiding to his diary on June 30, 1919, House 
conveyed his optimism, saying, “I believe the colonial 
mandates will be one of the chief accomplishments of the 
United States if the commission in London proceeds 
according to our expectations.”23 His confidence proved 
well-placed, at least if we measure the final resolutions 
against the progressive standards of Wilson’s and House’s 
liberal internationalism. 
The road to a finalized colonial structure was not 
without its challenges, however. From the start, it became 
clear that the old-guard European colonialists favored less 
                                                          
21 House Diary, July 4, 1919, House Papers, Yale. 
22 Beer Diary, July 7, 1919, Library of Congress, 130.  
23 House Diary, June 30, 1919, House Papers, Yale. 
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oversight from the League and more administrative autonomy 
regarding both B and C mandates. The delegates met at 
Sunderland House twice on July 8, 1919, the first full day 
of negotiations in London. Since several topics had been 
broached during the preliminary discussion of June 28, 
these sessions were designated as the second and third 
meetings of the commission, respectively.  
The first priority was supposedly confined to drafting 
the B and C mandates and attempting to resolve the dispute 
between Belgium and Portugal over their competing claims in 
German East Africa. However, while initiating this 
discussion at the second meeting, a rather heated exchange 
broke out over an outlandish French proposal seeking 
compulsory military service for indigenous peoples in 
French-administered C-class territories, including the 
shocking demand that France be allowed to post such forces 
to France proper for defense purposes. Simon claimed the 
request had been granted during a Council of Ten meeting in 
Paris on January 30, though in reality both Wilson and 
Lloyd George had vehemently opposed the idea at the time. 
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Clemenceau had backed off and seemingly abandoned the 
notion.
24
  
House was therefore quite angry that Simon and the 
French were attempting to push this idea through in London. 
He and the British commission members rejected Simon’s 
request out of hand. House even claimed, rather 
melodramatically, that such a provision could jeopardize 
the American acceptance of the peace treaty. Simon 
responded by reiterating the French position voiced in 
Paris–that a colony was “really no different than a 
mandate.”25 Thus, the French sought only to administer their 
mandated territories as they would any colonial possession. 
Such open truth shocked the more idealistic members 
present, including Beer, but in the end, tempers cooled and 
the matter was pushed to the side. Since House, Cecil, and 
Beer objected to the proposal, Simon and his French 
colleagues chose not to press the matter further, though, 
in the end, it remained conspicuously unresolved. It is 
important to note, however, that House’s objection to 
France employing indigenous forces for strategic security 
                                                          
24 Notes of the Second and Third Meetings of the Commission on Mandates, 
July 8, 1919, File No. 181.227, General Records of the American 
Commission to Negotiate Peace. Council of Ten Minutes, January 30, 
1919, FRUS:PPC, 3: 804.  
25 Ibid. 
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grew from his belief that such a blatantly imperialistic 
colonial practice would jeopardize the progressivism that 
he and Wilson relied upon to inspire the masses, both in 
Europe and the colonial world. He stated as much in his 
diary, saying that regardless of the French right to 
administer territory as they saw fit, “using native 
military personnel would undermine the integrity of the 
mandates through imperial posturing.”26 House therefore had 
no desire to support a proposal that would likely generate 
a great deal of unnecessary hostility and possibly garner 
bad press.        
Significantly, initial model drafts of the B and C 
mandates were completed during the commission’s third 
meeting in the afternoon of July 8.
27
 They strongly 
resembled the structure outlined in Paris. The B-mandate 
nations required more time than those under A mandates 
before becoming fully independent. These countries would be 
assigned in trust to a League member, who would then be 
responsible for overseeing the territory’s progressive 
development under League provisions. C-mandate territories 
would technically function under the same provisions as the 
                                                          
26 House Diary, July 9, 1919, House Papers, Yale. 
27 Notes of the Third Meeting of the Commission on Mandates, July 8, 
1919, File No. 181.227, General Records of the American Commission to 
Negotiate Peace. 
159 
B-mandate countries, though they would be under even more 
extensive—and long-term—control by the League.28 
Unfortunately, soon the delegates were arguing over 
other matters. At the fourth and fifth meetings of the 
commission, the issue of economic equality inside B and C-
mandated territories proved contentious. The French 
delegation favored allowing the mandatory power, rather 
than native personnel, to administer utilities (such as 
telegraph lines) and build or expand basic infrastructure 
(such as railways). According to this notion, the 
indigenous populations could easily be deprived of economic 
independence and vitality because the mandatory power could 
dictate the economic processes, from overseeing basic 
public works to choosing which bidders received 
construction contracts.
29
 
Lord Robert Cecil and George Louis Beer strenuously 
objected to the idea. Cecil asked why it should matter 
which nationality built something like a railway. Lord 
Milner voiced his concern as well. But Simon responded by 
stating, “it would be most unfair that all the benefits of 
                                                          
28 Council of Four Minutes, May 5, 1919, FRUS:PPC, 5: 472-73. See also 
Louis, Great Britain’s Lost Colonies, 132-36, and Lloyd George, The 
Truth About the Peace Treaties, 1: 543-48. 
29 Notes of the Fourth and Fifth Meetings of the Commission on Mandates, 
July 9, 1919, File No. 181.227, General Records of the American 
Commission to Negotiate Peace. 
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occupation under the Mandate should go to the foreigners 
(indigenous peoples) and all the cost to the Mandatory 
Power.” Viscount Chinda agreed in principle with the French 
proposal, hoping to secure Japan’s administrative oversight 
in its own mandated territories.
30
  
Though, strangely, Cecil is often credited with the 
compromise plan, in actuality House proposed the middle 
road. In order to resolve the debate over the economic 
extent of administrative oversight as well as the possible 
cost-revenue disparity, he proposed that each mandatory 
power be allowed to create economic infrastructures 
independently of other countries, stating “the Mandatory 
Power shall be free to organize essential public works and 
services on such terms and conditions as it may think 
just.”31 Thus a degree of administrative freedom was 
established, appeasing Simon and Chinda in particular.  
However, House followed this statement by suggesting 
that the natives should have recourse if the mandatory 
power abused its authority in the economic realm. In a 
rather clever move, he proposed that, upon its formal 
establishment, the League of Nations executive council 
                                                          
30 Extended Minutes of Commission Meeting, July 9, 1919, House Papers, 
Yale. Box 196, Folder 2, 378. 
31 Ibid. 
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should be the final arbiter in these matters. Hence, as 
with most of the peace provisions, Wilson’s League would be 
responsible for determining whether social and economic 
progressivism was being served in the mandated territories. 
This was quite a diplomatic coup, and House was no doubt 
thrilled when his proposals were accepted by the other 
commission members in a meeting on July 10 at Sunderland 
House.
32
 House sent a telegram to Wilson in Washington, 
D.C., with a full report on the B and C mandates.
33
 
Beer left London for Paris on July 13, and remained 
there until August, when he rejoined the commission. House 
was actually grateful for the autonomy over the last half 
of July. For his part, House still valued Beer’s colonial 
insights and scholarly mind, but felt that true Wilsonian 
progressivism might be hindered if Beer’s overly idealistic 
notions were given too much credence.
34
 Conversely, Beer’s 
diary reveals a growing distaste for House, both personally 
and professionally.
35
 The time apart proved valuable for 
both.  
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In Beer’s absence, House, Milner, and Cecil pursued 
several shared objectives in their negotiations with Simon, 
Chinda, and Italy’s delegate Guglielmo Marconi, the first 
of which involved whether the indigenous peoples should 
incur debt for the vast costs of economic and political 
administration by the mandatory powers. France and Japan 
favored a rather high debt ceiling, with unforgiving 
interest rates imposed on the territories, to help offset 
the costs of trusteeship. At a meeting on July 14, the 
commission members forged an agreement advocated by House, 
Cecil, and Milner that ostensibly offered the native 
peoples a reasonably balanced approach to the debt issue, 
in which the League would place limitations on overall debt 
to be repaid. The details would be worked out at a future 
time, once the League was established. House reported to 
Wilson that he was pleased that “there was general 
unanimity of purpose to protect the natives in every way 
possible.”36  
Nonetheless, this was one of the key ironies of the 
entire negotiating process, conveying the philosophical 
depth of Euro-American cultural imperialism. If the 
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mandatory powers had been willing to forego their neo-
colonial designs and allow the former German and Turkish 
colonies to achieve independence, the costs of territorial 
administration would have been limited and short-lived. 
Driven by their own ambitions, however, the conquering 
nations had chosen to pursue the formation of the mandates. 
Yet here they conveyed a desire to possess the territories 
and pin the economic burdens on the very people whose 
future freedom and independence they supposedly sought. If 
anything highlights the neo-imperialism of the mandate 
system, this is it. The idea signaled nothing more than a 
veiled form of traditional colonialism, the likes of which 
had ravaged indigenous cultures for centuries. 
In mid-to-late July, a few outstanding issues were 
addressed by the commission members, ranging from Liberia’s 
progressively-staged loan payments to the necessity of 
curtailing arms and liquor traffic in East Africa. The 
discussions on these topics were relatively straightforward 
and intuitive, requiring limited negotiation. However, 
hearing the Belgian and Portuguese claims to parts of 
German East Africa remained a crucial task for the 
commission members. In the initial discussion of these 
claims on July 16, the delegates decided to focus on the 
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Belgian proposal and delay the Portugal discussion until a 
later date.
37
  
The debate over the Belgian claim to part of German 
East Africa centered upon King Leopold’s notoriously brutal 
colonial policies in the Congo during the late nineteenth 
century. How, asked Lord Robert Cecil, could the commission 
seriously consider acquiescing in Belgium’s request given 
its colonial atrocities of the past? Though he was in Paris 
during these meetings, Beer later expressed similar 
concerns about supplying Belgium with a mandate. However, 
at the eighth meeting on July 17, the commission made the 
decision to hold off on a final resolution for a few weeks, 
allowing the commission members to further consider the 
stakes of the Belgian claim in the former German East 
Africa.
38
 In fact, during the third and fourth weeks of 
July, the commission members decided to spend some time 
away from the burdens of foreign relations. House spent the 
time resting for the most part, though he did socialize in 
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1919, File No. 181.227, General Records of the American Commission to 
Negotiate Peace. 
165 
the evenings with a number of British friends and 
acquaintances, including Winston Churchill.
39
 
By the first week of August, the commission members 
were ready to resume their full-time duties and finalize 
the remaining resolutions. The delegates met briefly on the 
morning of August 5 to discuss the Belgian and Portuguese 
claims, but decided to postpone the discussion until later 
in the evening.
40
 Finally, during the tenth meeting of the 
commission, the Portuguese and Belgian claims to parts of 
German East Africa were resolved. Portugal desired a small 
triangle of the former German colony, arguing that the 
territory had been theirs prior to German conquest. Given 
these historic roots, the Portuguese claim seemed quite 
reasonable to the commission members. Only Beer expressed 
any doubts, though he was not overly adamant about these. A 
brief debate ensued over whether the sliver of territory 
merited a mandate. Lord Milner thought granting a mandate 
for such a miniscule portion of land was absurd, and 
therefore, in a show of arbitrary imperialism, he proposed 
simply assigning the area as Portuguese colonial territory, 
free from oversight as a mandate by the League. This 
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40 Notes of the Ninth Meeting of the Commission on Mandates, August 5, 
1919, File No. 181.227, General Records of the American Commission to 
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proposal was quickly accepted, and the commission moved on 
to resolve the Belgian claim.
41
 
In the end, regardless of their misgivings about 
Belgium’s capacity to oversee a part of German East Africa 
in a manner befitting an enlightened, progressive power, 
the Belgian claim to Ruanda-Burundi was upheld. Belgium was 
assigned this territory while the British Empire acquired 
most of the former German East African colony under the 
provisions of B-class mandates. Beer and Cecil were deeply 
concerned about this resolution, but nonetheless went 
along. Since Belgium was a strategic and cultural ally of 
France, House and Milner both felt that blocking the 
Belgian claim would be both counterproductive and 
destabilizing, especially given the contentious nature of 
French colonial policy. House even suggested that giving 
the lands to someone other than Belgium—namely Great 
Britain—would strengthen the anti-British opposition to the 
peace treaty. It was that simple. As Beer wrote in his 
diary, “in such ways are the fates of three-and-a-half 
million human beings determined.”42 
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By the second week of August, the only remaining tasks 
involved drafting the A-class mandates and then providing 
recommendations for the League of Nations regarding the 
mandate assignments for the various nations. The only 
significant change to the A mandates as outlined in Paris 
involved a clause recommending that the mandatory power be 
responsible for securing civil order as the A-class nation 
neared its final goal of independence. The B and C mandates 
were structured along the lines of the July 8 meeting.
43
 
The commission concluded its resolutions in late 
August by recommending the assignment of mandates according 
to the following categories: Class A Mandates were to be 
quite limited in number, primarily because they were 
supposedly ready to be “brought along swiftly” toward 
outright independence, though none achieved that status 
until the 1940s. Nonetheless, the commission’s proposal 
suggested dual mandates for Great Britain in Palestine and 
Mesopotamia, though the latter was not enacted. The French 
were also given Syria as an A mandate.
44
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44 Mandate Commission’s recommendations on the assignment of A, B, and C 
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Class B mandates were more plentiful. These, of 
course, required greater levels of political oversight by 
the mandatory power, but were intended for independence at 
a “reasonable point in the future.” The protectorates of 
Ruanda and Burundi, formerly of German East Africa, were 
suggested for Belgium, to be administered as a single 
mandate. The British were to gain Tanganyika and then split 
the Cameroons and Togoland with the French, as agreed upon 
in Paris.
45
 
Lastly, Class C mandates were to be assigned along the 
following lines. The peoples in these territories would 
ostensibly require long-term oversight by a mandatory power 
until ready for independence at an indeterminate date in 
the distant future. Australia was slated to receive 
mandates for the former territories of German New Guinea, 
renamed Papua New Guinea, while New Zealand would acquire 
German Samoa, renamed Western Samoa. As proposed, Japan’s 
South Sea Mandate would involve former German territories 
in a number of Pacific Islands, including the Marianas and 
the Marshall Islands. And, of course, Jan Smuts’ South 
Africa would be granted what they coveted most, the freedom 
to combine their own territory with the former German 
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South-West Africa.
46
 When Article 22 of the League of 
Nations Covenant was formally adopted in 1922, the mandate 
system assignments conformed to these recommendations, with 
only a few minor adjustments.
47
 
A brief concluding critique of Edward House and the 
Mandates Commission is in order. What did the commission 
members generate in July and August of 1919? Obviously, the 
mandatory powers were given extensive political and 
economic authority over the former German and Turkish 
territories, especially in the B- and C-class mandates. In 
essence, the idea that traditional colonialism would vanish 
in favor of enlightened trusteeship and progression toward 
political and territorial independence by colonial peoples 
was largely false. Instead, the mandate system’s imperial 
legacy became evident, as resolution after resolution 
favored the mandatory powers’ control over indigenous 
peoples in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East. The question 
is, how complicit was the United States in forming the 
system’s imperial elements during the London meetings? The 
traditional view is that House was overly conciliatory 
without Wilson’s guiding presence in London, too willing to  
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compromise American principles and acquiesce in European 
imperial claims, especially with his British friends, Lord 
Robert Cecil and Lord Alfred Milner.
48
 In other words, he 
sold America (and Wilson) out on the colonial issues. Is 
this true?  
The reality is that Wilson and House were consistently 
in contact throughout July and August. House sent telegrams 
every few days to Wilson as well as Secretary of State 
Robert Lansing, informing them about the proposals and 
resolutions of the Mandates Commission. Wilson was 
certainly not kept in the dark. More importantly, however, 
the president never challenged the positional statements 
that House included in these telegrams. Rather, Wilson 
conveyed pleasure and confidence in the work that House, 
Milner, Cecil, and the others were achieving. On July 18, 
Wilson sent a telegram to House in which he affirmed, “I 
find the model mandates B and C quite satisfactory.”  At 
his meeting with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 
August 19, the president reaffirmed: “The whole system of 
mandates is intended for the development and protection of 
the territories to which they apply—that is to say, to 
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protect their inhabitants, to assist their development 
under the operation of the opinion of the world, and to  
lead to their ultimate independent existence.”49 
None of this is surprising. The colonial system 
established in Paris and London was, in reality, well 
aligned with the progressive standards of Wilson and House, 
both of whom sought to overhaul traditional colonialism, 
while ensuring their progressive standards could still be 
structured and implemented globally according to the 
Wilsonian standard. House accomplished these goals in 
London, most importantly through his continued insistence 
that the League of Nations retain final authority over the 
colonial administrative processes. We must remember that, 
from the beginning, the League was intended to function as 
an extension of Wilsonian philosophy, an instrument of 
progressive culture on the international stage. By ensuring 
the League’s authority over the colonial world vis-à-vis 
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the Mandate System, Edward House successfully served 
Wilson’s true principles.  
174 
CONCLUSION 
The mandate system of 1919 was ostensibly created to 
ensure cultural progress and eventual independence for 
colonial peoples. However, as this study has shown, in 
reality the mandates ultimately served as the foundation 
for ongoing colonial practices in Africa, Asia, and the 
Middle East. Not until the post-World War Two era did many 
colonial territories finally gain their independence as new 
nations, often through brutal, hard-fought wars against the 
very governments assigned, in 1919, as benevolent trustees, 
charged with overseeing the indigenous nations’ prosperity 
and growth. 
In Alabama in Africa, Andrew Zimmermann reached a 
similar conclusion with particular reference to Togo. He 
observes: “The American ‘Negro question’ became a 
foundational feature, blacks themselves a constituent 
exclusion, of the international order that emerged between 
the Berlin West African Conference and the Paris Peace 
Conference. Excluding blacks not only from what was called 
civilization without outside intervention, helped Europeans 
and Americans found a League of Nations to enforce what was 
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supposed to be universal.”1 Emphasizing continuity from the 
previous European colonial imperialism to the new system of 
mandates under the League’s supervision, Zimmermann 
continues, “The transnational ‘Negro question,’ the 
attempts by white elites to impose interlinked regimes of 
political and economic control over African Americans and 
Africans, became fundamental to the renewed colonial 
civilizing mission of the League of Nations.”2 
What responsibility did the United States have in 
these affairs? While the evils of the mandate system are 
generally acknowledged, most historians believe that the 
American delegates at Paris and London were forced into 
numerous compromises by Britain, France, the British 
Dominions, and others. Such interpretations are deeply 
flawed because they frame Edward House and Woodrow Wilson 
as overly naïve idealists who misunderstood both the 
realities of the postwar world and the imperial designs of 
their European counterparts. By defining President Wilson’s 
rhetoric on national self-determination in literal terms, 
which seemed to promise quick progress toward independence 
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for colonial peoples, most scholars have portrayed the 
mandates as indicators of American diplomatic failure.   
The reality, however, was that colonial imperialism 
did not continue simply because Wilson, House, and other 
American peace delegates buckled under pressures from less 
idealistic Europeans. The Wilsonian worldview was far more 
complex. While Wilson’s own liberal internationalist vision 
sought to alter traditional colonial structures, it did not 
conform to the idealistic progressivism embraced by many of 
his contemporaries, nor did it align with the subsequent 
definitions by many scholars. Wilson and House were not 
seeking immediate independence for most former German and 
Turkish territories. Their understanding of progressive 
civilization was not based on notions of universal liberty 
and equality. They looked down on native cultures deemed 
inferior to Anglo-Saxon civilization. Moreover, the United 
States actually took the lead in forming postwar colonial 
policy, advocating change that proved far more 
imperialistic than many scholars acknowledge.  
Beginning in 1917 with his supervision of The Inquiry 
and ending in 1919 with the Mandates Commission in London, 
Edward House was responsible for molding and assigning the 
colonial settlement. Guided by Wilson, and imbued with the 
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president’s enlightened notions, House fashioned an 
eminently suitable structure that neatly aligned with the 
Wilsonian philosophy of cultural progress. Hence, despite 
the various concessions made by Wilson and House, the 
creation of the mandate system should be viewed as a 
significant achievement for Wilsonian progressivism as 
understood by both men.  
In essence, Wilson and House were intent on modifying 
the traditional forms of colonialism, using idealistic 
rhetoric to rationalize and convey their own imperial 
philosophies. After all, Wilson and House founded their 
postwar colonial vision on the principle of national self-
determination, specifically defined as an extension of 
Wilsonian progressivism. Moreover, they stipulated that the 
League of Nations would administer any colonial structure 
created and assigned by the delegates. Again, Wilson’s 
League would be granted the power to decide whether the 
indigenous peoples were ready to govern their own fates. It 
would, paradoxically, determine national self-
determination. 
By August of 1919, the final resolutions by the 
Mandates Commission affirmed this crucial aspiration. After 
months of negotiation, the commission formally recommended 
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the mandate system for implementation by the new League of 
Nations. Its provisions ensured League supervision of the 
colonial settlement. This was significant. Ultimately, the 
colonial system established in Paris and London was well 
aligned with the progressive standards of Wilson and House, 
both of whom sought to overhaul traditional colonialism, 
while ensuring that cultural progress could still be 
structured and implemented globally according to their 
Wilsonian standard. Moreover, the fact that Wilson’s League 
would be granted supervisory control over the mandate 
system promised that Wilsonian progressivism would be 
served regardless of French or British intentions.  
In the end, the Wilsonian progressive vision was 
inherent in the veiled imperialism contained in the mandate 
system. Rhetoric aside, Wilson and House failed to embrace 
the inherent geopolitical realities of a pluralist world. 
As a result, they sanctioned a deeply flawed, racist system 
of mandates favoring white, European political and cultural 
dominance over indigenous peoples.  
In this light, the genuine nature and intent of 
Wilsonian philosophy is revealed. Wilson and House were not 
truly concerned with fostering colonial independence in the 
near future. Rather, they desired to build a new order, 
179 
bestowing American cultural progressivism on colonial 
peoples. While arguably different from traditional forms of 
colonialism, such notions furnished merely a new framework 
for imperialism, hidden behind idealistic rhetoric and 
administered by the League of Nations for a progressive 
future. 
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